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Abstract 
Lending to corporates in foreign currencies can expose banks to substantial currency risk. 
Using global syndicated loan data, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in exchange 
rate volatility increases loan spreads by approximately 20 basis points for loans made in a 
currency different from the lenders’. This implies excess interest of approximately USD 2.55 
million for loans of average size and duration. We show that our finding is mostly attributed to 
credit constraints and deviations from perfect competition in international lending markets. 
Borrowers can lower the extra cost by forming strong lending relationships with their banks. 
 
 
Keywords: Global syndicated loans; Foreign currency lending; Exchange rate risk; Bank 
market power; Relationship lending. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks’ cross-border claims toward the nonbanking sector have expanded considerably in 
recent decades, amounting to USD 13.1 trillion as of September 2017 (BIS, 2018). About 20% 
(USD 2.6 trillion) of these claims are in foreign currencies, and the market is expanding 
substantially toward emerging market economies. These facts naturally raise questions about 
the role that exchange rate risk plays in international bank lending and, specifically, on the 
pricing of loans in foreign currency. How important is the exchange rate risk banks bear when 
lending in a different currency? Do banks pass this risk to their borrowers in the form of higher 
cost of loans, and is this cost economically important? How different is this cost across 
borrowing firms with different firm characteristics, riskiness, and lending relationships with 
the banks? These are the questions addressed in this paper. 
There are two sides to exchange rate risk in cross-border lending: foreign firms 
borrowing in the lender’s currency - henceforth foreign-currency borrowing - which implies 
exchange rate risk for the borrower (demand-side risk), and lending to foreign firms in the 
borrower’s currency - henceforth foreign-currency lending - which implies exchange rate risk 
for the lender (supply-side risk). Such foreign-currency lending has significantly increased over 
the last three decades, despite the credit market freeze during the global financial crisis. 
Syndicated foreign-currency lending reported in Dealscan reached about USD one trillion in 
2015 and has surpassed syndicated foreign-currency borrowing since 2000 (Figure 1). In this 
paper, we examine whether and how banks price exchange rate risk in foreign-currency 
lending. Despite the existence of a substantial literature on cross-border lending foreign-
currency borrowing (e.g., Francis and Hunter, 2012; Brown, Kirschenmann, and Ongena, 2014; 
Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2017), the effect of exchange rate risk on foreign-currency 
lending has not received much attention.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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Exchange rate risk is costly for lenders, implying a higher lending rate or higher loan 
fees. Higher lending costs create a competitive disadvantage for affected borrowers compared 
to firms that can access the domestic credit market and thus face no exchange rate risk on their 
loans. The higher cost of credit can have significant implications for the profitability and 
international competitiveness of borrowers engaging in foreign currency lending, especially 
given that in our data these firms appear on average to be less risky (i.e., they are more 
profitable and have less leverage) than firms borrowing in the bank’s currency. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the causal effect of exchange rate risk on the cost of 
credit and other corporate loan characteristics. We use data from the global syndicated loan 
market. These data are ideal for our setting because they are at the loan level, which is helpful 
to achieve adequate identification of causal effects, and they include bank loans to several 
countries, provide information about several loan characteristics, and can be matched with the 
exchange-rate conditions prior to loan origination.  
The dataset covers the period 1984-2016, although most loans originate from 1994 
onward, and includes more than 100,000 loan deals. Our main outcome variable is the all-in-
drawn spread (AISD), which includes the loan spread over LIBOR plus any facility fee. The 
main explanatory variable is a measure of exchange rate risk based on the realized volatility of 
the bilateral exchange rate between the borrower’s and the lender’s (i.e., the lead lenders of the 
syndicate) countries over a one-month, three-month, or six-month period. Alternatively, we 
use forward-looking measures of exchange rate risk (i.e., measures based on forward, rather 
than spot, rates). 
We draw causal inferences from an approach that has two important characteristics. 
First, we compare the differential effect of exchange rate risk on the cost of credit between 
loans denominated in a currency different from the lender’s currency (the treatment group) and 
loans denominated in the lender’s currency (the control group). In principle, exchange rate risk 
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should have a strong effect only on the treatment group, and any effect on the control group 
should reflect macroeconomic risk and ideally be captured by relevant macroeconomic control 
variables. This approach is very similar to the differences-in-differences (DiD) approach by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), who identify the effect of financial development on growth, and of 
many other studies from that point onward. 
Second, the multiple loan facilities per firm every year allow the fielding of “firm times 
year” fixed effects, which allows us to control for time-varying demand-side (firm-year) forces 
that might affect the relation between exchange rate risk and loan spreads. Intuitively, these 
forces include any exchange rate risk borrowers face - that is, the demand-side exchange rate 
risk in foreign-currency borrowing documented in the previous literature (Francis and Hunter, 
2012; Bergbrant, Francis, and Hunter, 2016; Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2017).  
We find that the effect of exchange rate risk on AISD is both statistically and 
economically significant. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in our measure of 
exchange rate risk based on the three-month volatility of the exchange rate yields an AISD that 
is approximately 20 basis points higher for loans made in a currency different from the lender’s 
compared to those made in the lender's currency. Economically, this is a large effect, equal to 
a 7% higher AISD compared to the average in our sample, highlighting a substantial cost to 
borrowing firms vis-à-vis international competitors that (can) borrow in their bank’s currency. 
We further show the importance of this cost by calculating the extra interest payments 
for these firms. For the average loan size and maturity, an AISD that is 20 basis points higher 
corresponds to approximately USD 2.55 million in higher interest expense over the loan’s 
duration. Thus, we can infer that foreign exchange risk implies substantially higher cost of 
credit for firms borrowing in a currency different than their lenders’ compared to firms 
borrowing in their banks’ domestic currency.  
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 Several sensitivity tests show that these baseline findings are robust. The most 
important of these tests are the following five. First, we use different sets of fixed effects (e.g., 
Jimenez et al., 2014). These include “bank times year” fixed effects that saturate the model 
from time-varying bank-side explanations of the findings, as well as “country-per-year” fixed 
effects that saturate the model from the effects of country-pair characteristics that might be 
otherwise captured by our measures of exchange rate risk (e.g., Jimenez et al., 2014). Second, 
we use specifications with different control variables to show that the results are not driven by 
a “bad controls problem”. Third, given that the number of loans differs by country or country-
pair, we use a weighted-least-squares approach (e.g., Delis, Hasan, and Ongena, 2017). Fourth, 
the results are robust when using a Heckman-type model, which considers the probability of a 
firm borrowing in a currency different than the lenders’ currency to account for endogeneity 
(Dass and Massa, 2011). Fifth, we show that our specifications are robust to the exclusion of 
fixed effects and the inclusion of more than 30 control variables characterizing the within-year 
monetary environment as well as institutional and economic differences between the lenders’ 
and borrowers’ countries.  
We conduct additional analysis to understand the reasons behind our main finding on 
the pricing of exchange rate risk in foreign-currency lending, especially given that banks can 
hedge against this risk. First, we consider variation in liquidity of hedging instruments in the 
foreign exchange market, measured using bid-ask data for forward rates across currencies and 
time. Even though we find evidence that our liquidity measures directly affect the cost of credit, 
the relation between exchange rate risk and the cost of credit remains intact whereas liquidity 
does not cause heterogeneity in that relation, being unable to explain the differences in loan 
pricing observed in the data across firms. Next, we turn to measures of credit constraints and 
bank market power. We find that in countries with higher credit to the private sector as a share 
of GDP the relation between exchange rate risk and the cost of credit is significantly weaker. 
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Similarly, our main finding is significantly stronger as bank market power (measured by the 
Lerner index) increases. Thus, we identify domestic credit constraints and market power of 
lenders as the most significant factors causing heterogeneous effects in the nexus between 
exchange rate risk and the cost of credit.      
Overall, these findings yield the natural question of whether the affected firms can do 
anything to remedy this competitive disadvantage. We consider two potential strategies. The 
first involves firms formulating repeated lending relationships with their lead lender(s). We 
provide evidence that firms with at least one more loan with the same lead arranger in the last 
two years prior to the current loan are exposed to significantly lower cost of credit compared 
to firms for which the current loan is the first with the specific lead lender. We thus contend 
that establishing a long-term relationship with the lender is key to mitigate the increased cost 
of credit due to exchange rate risk. The second strategy is to enhance the loan contract with 
more covenants (or with specific covenants) and to change the structure of the syndicate by 
including more banks in the loan syndicate or by changing the share of the lead lender. 
However, we find that such practices do not mitigate the impact of exchange rate risk in loan 
pricing equations, and that therefore cross-sectional variation in these aspects of the loan does 
not affect the loan spreads.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights the reasons for foreign-
currency lending. It also relates our study to the existing literature and further highlights the 
novelty of our work relative to that literature. Section 3 discusses the data set and the empirical 
specification. Section 4 presents and discusses our main empirical results, showing the impact 
of exchange rate risk on the cost of credit. Section 5 shows the importance of bank-firm 
relationships as a remedy for the increased cost of credit. Section 6 concludes the paper. An 
Internet Appendix provides a number of additional results, mainly related to robustness checks. 
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2. Motivation for foreign-currency lending and related literature 
Banks lend to foreign firms in the firms’ currencies for two interrelated reasons. First, they 
finance projects with positive net present values, and banks aim to overcome credit constraints 
for the relevant firms. This is evident in the fact that most foreign-currency lending occurs from 
banks in larger and more developed financial markets to firms in smaller and less developed 
ones. 1 Second, foreign-currency loans might be more profitable than alternative lending 
opportunities in the domestic market. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is self-selection: firms 
involved in foreign-currency lending are large, well-established, and profitable, with an 
international focus for their operations (Allayannis et al., 2003; Brown and De Haas, 2012). 
The three most closely related studies to ours are Francis and Hunter (2012), Bergbrant, 
Francis, and Hunter (2016), and Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017). The first two use 
data on syndicated loans to analyze how firms’ general exposure to exchange rate risk (i.e., 
because of their foreign operations) affects the cost of credit. Firms’ exposure is measured by 
the residual from a regression of firm returns on an exchange rate index and stock market 
returns. The difference in the scope of these two papers compared to our study is the focus on 
exchange rate risk of firms in general and not of foreign-currency lending, and the associated 
implications for firms borrowing in a currency different than the lenders’ currency. In fact, in 
our study we aim to control for such firm exchange rate risk (demand-side) and identify the 
bank’s (supply-side) pricing of exchange rate risk.   
Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017) use loan-level data from U.S. banks’ 
regulatory filings and find that a firm with debt denominated in foreign currency is more likely 
to become past due on its loans than a firm with local currency debt. This study is different 
from ours because it focuses on what we define as foreign-currency borrowing (foreign firms 
                                                 
1 Specifically, Dealscan lists 6,082 syndicated loan facilities from lenders headquartered in developed countries 
to borrowers headquartered in developing countries during 1989-2016. These facilities are in the borrowers’ 
currencies and amount to USD 819 billion. 
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borrowing in the lender’s currency), and on the probability of loan non-repayment (i.e., credit 
risk). Therefore, we address a different question in that we focus on the implications for the 
cost of credit in foreign-currency lending.2 
Several other studies relate to our research, with most of them analyzing the reasons for 
cross-border lending. Brown, Kirschenmann, and Ongena (2014), for example, use unique data 
on loans from a Bulgarian bank and show how the currency of the loan is determined. Brown 
and De Haas (2012) show that foreign banks lend more in foreign currency to corporate clients, 
but this is not because of better access to wholesale funding. Bacchetta and Merrouche (2016) 
identify the reasons behind the increase in foreign-currency borrowing by European firms and 
suggest that this occurs when European lending standards tighten and Euribor spreads increase. 
Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2011) show that exchange rate volatility is not a key driver of 
foreign currency borrowing, but what matters is weak corporate governance and the absence 
of capital controls.  
Further, there is a large literature on how exchange rate risk in general (not via lending) 
affects firm performance. For example, Francis, Hasan, and Hunter (2008) show the 
importance of exchange rate movements for returns across virtually all U.S. industries, by 
separating the currency risk premium on industry stock returns into the component stemming 
from industrialized countries and the component stemming from other important trading 
partners from the emerging economies. Other relevant studies include Aghion et al. (2004), 
Kamil (2012), and Kim, Tesar, and Zhang (2015), among others. Finally, several other papers 
look into the role of foreign bank presence (e.g., Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005; Haselmann 
and Wachtel, 2011; Bräuning, and Ivashina, 2017). 
                                                 
2 Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017) use data for U.S. banks, which in their context has the advantage of 
including many more loans, not just syndicated loans. This reflects their focus on how changes in exchange rates 
affect credit risk. However, the global syndicated loans market is more suitable for our objectives in this paper, 
given the focus on the effect of exchange rate volatility, for which we obtain detailed information when looking 
at foreign-currency lending in many different countries.    
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Overall, therefore, while we build on prior literature on cross-border bank lending, this 
paper is the first to examine specifically foreign-currency lending and its implications for the 
cost of credit and pricing of currency risk. 
 
3. Data and empirical model 
This main data source is Dealscan, which includes the most comprehensive loan-deal 
information available on global syndicated loan markets. Our data set covers the period 1984-
2016 but loan coverage for most countries starts in 1993-1994. We drop all loans for which 
there is no conventional pricing (i.e., there is no spread) and this eliminates all types of Islamic 
finance and very specialized credit lines. Dealscan includes loan facilities for multiple 
participant banks, and we use the information at the loan facility level (the unit of our analysis). 
The number of loan facilities for our baseline specifications ranges from 107,100 to 110,574, 
depending on the controls used. These loans are drawn from firms operating in 87 countries. 
 We match the loans with bank-specific information from Bankscope; however, in most 
of the analysis we use bank × year fixed effects that render bank-year characteristics redundant. 
Similarly, by using firm × year fixed effects, we do not require any firm × year control 
variables. In a third round of data collection, we match the resulting dataset with 
macroeconomic (country-year) variables from several freely available sources. We provide 
variable definitions and sources in Table A1 of the Internet Appendix and basic summary 
statistics in Table 1. We provide additional summary statistics in Tables A2 and A3 (country-
year averages and country-specific averages, respectively).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 In Table A4 of the Internet Appendix, we report the number of foreign-currency loans 
(loans denominated in a currency different from the lender’s currency). Banks giving these 
loans are exposed to exchange rate risk (Forex risk). The total number of these loans is 16,024 
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and constitute approximately 14.6% of the full sample (equal to 107,751 loans in our preferred 
empirical specification). The relevant number of countries is 44. Essentially, our identification 
method aims at comparing the different (high) Forex risk of foreign-currency lending (i.e., the 
treatment group) with the (low) Forex risk of the rest of the loans, where the lender’s currency 
is the same as the loan currency (i.e., the control group). The control group of loans faces Forex 
risk only to the extent that this risk affects the macroeconomic environment. 
Empirical specification. Specifically, we use the following empirical model: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑡 ×
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝑢𝑙𝑡                                                                 (1)
   
The outcome variable Cost of credit measures the cost of loan facility l originated at time t. 
The most widely used measure is the all-in-drawn spread (AISD), denoting the spread over 
LIBOR, although some recent literature (e.g., Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz, 2017) also 
highlights the importance of fees and the all-in-spread undrawn (AISU). We define precisely 
these variables in Table A1. 
Forex risk for each loan facility is the realized volatility of the bilateral exchange rate 
between the borrower’s and the lender’s countries over an N-day period, or:  
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑡 = √
1
𝑁
∑(𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑖 − 𝜇)2
𝑖𝑁
                                                               (2) 
 
Essentially, equation (2) is the daily (percentage) change in the bilateral exchange rate between 
the lender country a and borrower country b, i days before the loan facility start date, with 𝜇 
being the average exchange rate over the N-day period. We compute realized volatility for one-
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month, three-month, and six-month periods preceding the origination date of the loan. For most 
of our analysis, we use three-month Forex risk, assuming that banks look at the volatility of 
exchange rates over three months prior to the loan origination date.  
In turn, Different currency equals 1 if the loan facility is originated in a currency 
different from the lender’s currency, and zero otherwise. The vector 𝑎0 denotes different types 
of fixed effects, described later. Controls is a vector of control variables of different dimension 
k. Finally, u is a stochastic disturbance. For detailed definitions, see Table A1. 
 The main coefficient of interest is 𝑎3, which shows the differential effect of Forex risk 
on the cost of credit between loans granted in the same and different currencies than the 
currency of the lender. Differently phrased, we obtain identification from the fact that foreign 
exchange risk affects the cost of loans made in a currency different from the lender’s currency 
(the treatment group) compared to loans made in the lender’s currency (the control group). We 
expect that 𝑎3 is positive if foreign exchange risk matters in foreign-currency lending and thus 
increases the cost of credit for borrowing firms.  
Moreover, the coefficient 𝑎1 shows how a one-point increase in Forex risk affects the 
cost of credit for all loans in the sample. If the model is well-identified, the interaction term 
and the control variables should explain (most of) the effect of Forex risk on the cost of credit 
(i.e., 𝑎1 should be statistically insignificant). This is because the effect of foreign exchange risk 
on the cost of loans made in the lender’s currency should be minimal or zero, especially when 
controlling for macroeconomic risk. 
 Controls and fixed effects. We include several control variables and, perhaps most 
important, fixed effects. Following the relevant literature (e.g., Ivashina, 2009; Delis, Hasan, 
and Ongena, 2017), we control for loan characteristics such as the log of the loan amount, loan 
maturity (in months), the number of lenders in the syndicate, dummies for performance-pricing 
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provisions and/or collateral, and the total number of covenants.3 For exact definitions of these 
variables, see Table A1; for summary statistics, see Table 1.   
 Importantly, we use firm × year and bank × year fixed effects. The former allow us to 
control for any time-varying demand (firm)-side explanations of our findings. These alternative 
explanations include the firms’ (demand-side) exposure to exchange rate risk (as opposed to 
the loan’s exposure that we examine in this study). The regression still yields results on the 
main coefficients of interest because there are multiple loan facilities to the same firm within 
years and Forex risk is identified within years.  
 In most of our specifications, we include the controls and fixed effects. We should note, 
however, that if our DiD method approximates a randomized experiment, then the different 
mix of fixed effects and control variables should not have a large effect on 𝑎3. We show that 
this holds in numerous sensitivity tests. We also conduct sensitivity tests without sets of control 
variables (especially the loan controls) to show that a “bad controls” problem does not affect 
the results.  
 Key summary statistics. In Panels A and B of Table 2 we report summary statistics for 
key loan features and foreign exchange risk measures for the control and treatment groups, 
respectively; Panel C reports their differences. We find that, on average, AISD is 27 basis points 
higher for firms receiving loans in their own currency compared to firms receiving loans in the 
lead bank’s currency. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level, and a similar 
picture extends to AISU. In addition, loans in the borrower’s currency are more likely to be 
secured and have a higher number of lenders. In contrast, lenders attach fewer provisions and 
covenants on these loans.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
3 Distinguishing between types of covenants (e.g., general and financial covenants) does not affect our results. 
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4. The effect of exchange rate risk on the cost of credit 
4.1. Baseline results 
Table 3 reports our baseline results. The different specifications include different types of fixed 
effects, with the more stringent one being that in column (5), which includes loan type, loan 
purpose, country-pair × year, firm × year, and bank × year fixed effects. 4 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The coefficient on Forex risk is statistically insignificant, which is intuitive as foreign 
exchange risk should not affect AISD unless the loan is in another currency and bears some 
exchange rate risk. Also, the coefficient on Different currency is negative and statistically 
significant at conventional levels (equal to approximately 11.5 basis points, according to 
specification 5). This is an interesting finding in itself, suggesting that when there is no foreign 
exchange risk, foreign loans go to firms with a lower average AISD (i.e., less risky firms 
compared to domestic ones).  
The main coefficient of interest 𝑎3 shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
Forex risk increases AISD by an average of 20 basis points for loans made in a currency 
different from the lender’s, compared to those made in the lender's domestic currency. 
Economically, this is a large effect, equal to a 7% increase for the average loan in our sample. 
Given that the average loan size is $259 million, firms facing exchange rate risk in their loans 
thus pay, on average, approximately USD 0.52 million (=$259,000,000 ×20 basis points) per 
year in excess interest in foreign currency lending operations. Considering that the average 
time to maturity is 4.9 years, this represents approximately USD 2.55 million in extra interest 
                                                 
4 The use of different fixed effects does not qualitatively affect the coefficient on the interaction term between 
Forex risk and Different currency, which is our main coefficient of interest. This suggests that the key results are 
invariant to the use of additional control variables, which is a requirement for the internal validity of a DiD 
approach.  
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expenses over the loan’s duration.5 Therefore, we can infer that foreign exchange risk 
substantially raises the cost of loans for firms borrowing in their domestic currencies compared 
to firms borrowing in the lead banks’ currency.  
Let us illustrate the implication of this estimate for a country. Take, for example, 
Australia. The average Forex risk for loans denominated in Australian dollars is 0.62 (i.e., 
approximately three times the average Forex risk for all loans to Australian firms regardless of 
their currency denomination; see Tables A3 and A4 of the Internet Appendix). When Forex 
risk is above its mean value, the average AISD on Australian dollar-denominated loans is 
169.10 basis points. This is 18% higher compared to an average AISD of 143.33 basis points 
when Forex risk is below its mean.6 Looking at specific subperiods, the average Forex risk for 
loans where an Australian firm is the borrower was 0.50 in 2014, and the average AISD on 
loans to Australian firms denominated in Australian dollars was 199.06 basis points. However, 
during 2015-2016, a period marked by a rise in the volatility of the Australian dollar, the 
corresponding mean value for Forex risk was 0.68, while the average AISD surged to 267.19 
basis points. Similar examples exist for other countries, among them countries with historically 
high currency volatility, such as emerging market countries. 
To illustrate the relative importance of exchange rate risk vis-à-vis the rest of the 
explanatory variables, we also report standardized coefficients in Table A5 of the Internet 
Appendix. The coefficient on the DiD is higher than any of the other loan and bank 
characteristics, second only to the fixed effects. The effect of the control variables is generally 
in line with our expectations and the recent literature on the determinants of loan spreads (e.g., 
Ferreira and Matos, 2012; Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis 2017). Specifically, a higher loan 
                                                 
5 Assuming five annual payments and LIBOR as the discount rate, the increase in interest expense equals USD 
2.3 million for an average 12-month LIBOR rate of 4.2% during our sample period (for similar calculations, see 
Ivashina and Sun, 2011). 
6 The price differential increases to 24% when we divide loans according to the median of Forex risk. In that case, 
the average AISD above and below the median of 0.56 was 170.13 and 137.56 basis points respectively. 
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amount and more syndicate members go hand-in-hand with the formation of the syndicate 
(Ivashina, 2009), together implying lower spreads. Loans with longer maturities impose a 
lengthier commitment for the syndicate members and thus carry a higher spread. Performance-
pricing provisions tie the spread to the firm’s financial condition, and thus their strong negative 
effect on AISD is intuitive. The role of covenants is different and their effect is positive, as 
using such instruments implies riskier loans (Demiroglu and James, 2010). 
Given that results from all specifications are consistent, we select specification in 
column (3) of Table 3 as our baseline, so as to draw inferences from specifications including 
both firm × year and bank × year fixed effects. However, for comparison, we also report in 
most of the following tables the results from a specification without bank × year fixed effects, 
as in column (2). 
In Tables 4 and 5, we consider alternative foreign exchange risk measures. In columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 4 we use the one-month version of our foreign exchange risk measure, and 
in columns (3) and (4) we use the six-month version. Both measures provide similar results to 
the baseline. Based on the similarity of the results, we conduct the rest of the analysis by 
employing the three-month Forex measure, but all results carry through (and are sometimes 
slightly stronger) when using the other measures of foreign exchange risk.  
Thus far, our findings are based on the assumption that volatility in spot exchange rates 
provides accurate information about exchange rate risk as viewed by lenders. By nature, the 
pricing of loan contracts is forward looking. Therefore, following the same methodology as for 
the calculation of our baseline exchange rate risk measure, we construct forward-looking 
exchange rate risk measures based on 3- and 6-month forward rates. We report results for these 
measures in Table 5.7 In all specifications and regardless of the foreign exchange risk measure 
                                                 
7 To ease interpretation, Table 5 presents results only for specifications with both firm × year and bank × year 
fixed effects. 
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employed, the DiD term has a positive and sizable effect on AISD, which increases with the 
maturity of the forward contract.  
[Insert Tables 4 & 5 about here] 
Subsequently, we sequentially exclude loan-level control variables from our 
specifications. These tests address whether (i) these variables yield a “bad controls” problem 
and (ii) any subgroup of variables exerts a disproportionate impact on our results.8 In the first 
two specifications of Table 6, we omit all loan-level variables; and in (3) and (4), we only 
include variables of a quantitative nature, namely Loan amount and Maturity. In the subsequent 
specifications, we exclude variables with qualitative information on the loan. This information 
pertains to the existence of collateral and the number of lenders (columns 5 and 6), or the 
existence of performance-pricing provisions and the number of general covenants attached to 
the loan (columns 7 and 8).9 
The coefficient on Forex risk × Different currency assumes values within the 25-31 
basis points range, confirming the higher cost of credit for international loans when these loans 
are denominated in the firm’s rather than the bank’s currency, ceteris paribus. Further, the 
coefficient on Different currency is consistently negative, although not always significant at 
conventional significance levels, revealing that in the absence of foreign exchange risk, loans 
carry a lower spread when made in the borrower’s currency.10 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Tables 3-6 reveal that the effect of control variables is generally in line with 
expectations and with previous work by Ivashina (2009), Bae and Goyal (2009), Delis, Hasan, 
and Ongena (2017), and Cai, Saunders, and Steffen (2018). In particular, loan spreads decrease 
                                                 
8 The “bad controls” problem might arise due to differences in the composition of loans to a particular firm. 
9 The replacement (or addition) of General covenants with Financial covenants or Net covenants leaves our results 
unchanged. 
10 Moreover, in Table A6 of the Appendix, we show that the term Forex risk × Different currency does not 
significantly explain the loan amount or maturity (i.e., we find no evidence for three-way causality with the loan 
amount or maturity), especially when controlling for bank × year fixed effects. 
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when loan amounts are lower and maturities increase. In addition, loans are more competitively 
priced when more members participate in the syndicate or when there are more performance 
provisions. Adding covenants, however, increases loan spreads. The behavior of the bank-level 
variables (in the models without bank × year fixed effects), defined in Table A1, is also 
intuitive: a higher return on bank assets is associated with a lower AISD, and higher 
nonperforming loans and risk-based capital ratios are associated with higher loan spreads. Last, 
bank size does not appear to matter for syndicated loan pricing. 
 
4.2. Weighted least squares 
So far, we assume that all loans enter the model with equal weights. However, the majority of 
loans denominated in foreign currency in the sample are to borrowers headquartered in 
developing countries. U.S. borrowers are approximately 46% of total observations (see Table 
A4 in the Internet Appendix). Normally, including country fixed effects in our baseline 
specification (or the country × year and country-pair × year in alternative specifications) 
provides a safeguard against cross-country variation. We nevertheless acknowledge that the 
empirical specification might leave the analysis open to the critique that countries receiving 
fewer loans might affect our results disproportionately. To this end, we re-estimate our 
preferred model specification using weighted least squares.  
 We report the results in Table 7, from specifications that include weights by lender’s 
country (columns 1 and 2) and by country-pair (columns 3 and 4).11 We find qualitatively 
identical results to the baseline results, and indeed stronger results for the importance of foreign 
exchange risk in loan pricing. The effect of Forex risk × Different currency on AISD is 
increased by 0.9-1.3 percentage points compared to the baseline results in Table 3, with spreads 
                                                 
11 We calculate weights by lender country as the number of loans from a given country in a given year to the total 
number of loans in that year. Weights by country-pair are the number of loans between a given country-pair (the 
pair of the borrower’s and the lender’s countries) in a given year to the total number of loans in that year.  
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of 7.9% and 8.3% (columns 2 and 4). Concerning the coefficients on Forex risk, Different 
currency, and the set of loan- and bank-level variables, their sign and level of statistical 
significance are generally the same as those found in the OLS specifications. We thus conclude 
that, if anything, the baseline results are conservative. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4.3. Results using AISU  
Another extension of our analysis relates to the role of loan fees. Berg, Saunders, and Steffen 
(2016) show that commitment plus facility fees, defined as the all-in-spread-undrawn (AISU), 
are larger for high-volatility firms. Thus, we might expect that higher volatility in bilateral 
exchange rates raises the cost of foreign currency-denominated loans through higher fees. 
Unfortunately, data on fees is generally not available or very limited in the global DealScan 
data. 
Nonetheless, in Table 8 we examine the baseline specification with AISU as the 
dependent variable. We do not detect a statistically significant effect of either Forex risk × 
Different currency or Different currency on AISU. Thus, it seems that the interaction of foreign 
exchange risk with the choice of currency denomination is only priced in spreads. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
4.4. Selection issues in foreign-currency lending 
An endogeneity problem different from the ones discussed so far arises due to possible 
selection in the firms’ decision to apply for foreign-currency lending. We do not expect this 
problem to be severe in our context, as presumably if firms had a better financing alternative 
they would use it. Nonetheless, to remedy a similar selection problem when using syndicated 
loans, Dass and Massa (2011) use Heckman’s (1979) method to determine the probability of 
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using the syndicated loan market in the first stage of their model. Our approach here follows 
this method. In the first stage, we use a probit model for the entire sample of loan facilities to 
estimate the determinants of the firm’s decision to use foreign-currency lending. Subsequently, 
in the second stage, we run the regression on the subsample of foreign-currency loan facilities.  
 Following Dass and Massa (2011), we assume that the firm’s decision to borrow from 
foreign banks in domestic currency is a function of the main determinants of the decision to 
borrow in general. These determinants include a set of loan-level characteristics; a set of 
weights for the number, origin, and direction of loans made in a given year; and loan type, loan 
purpose, year, bank, firm, and country dummies. We also include a number of firm-level 
characteristics, namely return on assets (Firm return on assets), size (Firm size), the ratio of 
the market value of assets to the book value of assets (Tobin’s Q), the ratio of tangible assets 
to total assets (Tangibility), and the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage). Finally, we 
include the number of loans a given bank makes in a given year (Lender loans), the number of 
loans for a given pair of lender and borrower countries in a given year (Country-pair loans), 
and the total number of loans granted in a given year (Total loans). 
 We report first- and second-stage results in Table A7 of the Internet Appendix (Panels 
A and B, respectively). Focusing on probit estimates (Panel A), we observe that the higher the 
return on assets and the size of the firm, the less likely foreign-currency lending is. 
Unsurprisingly, firms decide to use this market if they require large loans; however, these loans 
increasingly require collateral and performance-pricing provisions. The second-stage estimates 
show that the effect of Forex risk on AISD is even more potent compared to our baseline 
estimates: spreads now rise by 10.9% to 14% in response to a one-standard-deviation increase 
across all specifications. 
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4.5. Differences between U.S. and European lenders 
In this section, we examine potential differences in the effect of Forex risk on loans granted by 
U.S. and European Union (EU) lenders. Average spreads for syndicated loans are 
approximately 30 basis points smaller in Europe (see Carey and Nini, 2007). However, this 
difference in pricing is not confirmed when considering AISU (Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and 
Streitz, 2017). In Table A8, we interact our DiD term with USA (columns 1 and 2) and EU 
(columns 3 and 4). These are two binary variables representing loans granted by U.S. lenders 
and EU lenders, respectively. Our double interaction term is statistically significant at 
conventional levels across all four specifications, and its magnitude lies within the range 
suggested by the baseline estimates. In contrast, triple interactions, albeit positive, are not 
statistically significant, suggesting no differential effect for U.S. versus EU lenders. Hence, 
when adding the coefficient on the triple interaction term to that on Forex risk × Different 
currency, the overall effect of exchange rate risk on loan spreads becomes even more 
pronounced. 
 
4.6. Control for monetary policy 
So far, our analysis uses bank × year and firm × year fixed effects to control for time-varying 
country determinants of the cost of credit. An important determinant of exchange rates within-
year is the stance of monetary policy (e.g., Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995) and in this section 
we consider controlling for monetary policy in equation (1). We do so for two interrelated 
reasons. First, exchange rate volatility might capture changes in monetary policy, i.e. reflecting 
omitted variable bias. Second, the risk-taking channel of monetary policy predicts a positive 
relation between expansionary monetary policy and bank risk-taking.12 If low interest rates 
                                                 
12 Evidence on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy is provided by, among others, Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, 
and Saurina (2014), Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marquéz-Ibáñez (2014), and Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis (2017). 
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entice banks to take more risk and there are systematic risk differences in international vs. 
domestic lending unrelated to exchange rate risk, the interaction term Forex risk × Different 
currency might simply capture such risk differences induced by monetary shocks. 
We examine the role of monetary policy using a subsample consisting of the U.S., the 
Eurozone, Japan, and the UK. In these countries, we can better identify the stance of monetary 
policy, especially using measures encompassing non-standard monetary policy post crisis.13 
We use the shadow short rate (one- and three-month averages), which provides a more accurate 
description of monetary policy stance when interest rates are near the zero lower bound, 
compared to the actual short rate (Krippner, 2016; Von Borstel, Eickmeier, and Krippner, 
2016). Following the risk-taking channel literature, we lag all measures of monetary policy by 
one period. 
 The results in Table A9 show that our DiD term does not lose in explanatory power: 
the magnitude is in fact stronger than in Table 3. The coefficients on each of the monetary 
policy measures are negative and statistically significant, supporting the positive relation 
between expansionary monetary policy and bank loan rates (i.e., a risk-taking channel). These 
results are in line with Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis (2017) and Paligorova and Santos (2017), 
who use syndicated loans to identify the risk-taking channel in the United States. 14  
 
4.7. Additional sensitivity tests 
In columns (1) and (2) of Table A10, we control for the introduction of the euro by attaching 
the same country number to each Eurozone country following the replacement of its national 
                                                 
13 The adoption of a single monetary policy in the Eurozone occurred concurrently with the initiation of the third 
stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on January 1, 1999. Therefore, we conduct this exercise for 
1999-2017. However, the results hold even when extending the subsample to the pre-1999 period (available on 
request). 
14 We also experiment with specifications including monetary policy variables, where we cluster the standard 
errors by bank, firm, and year. This is because the more limited number of countries might yield the need for more 
micro-clustering of standard errors. The results are qualitatively identical. 
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currency. This change concerns our list of borrower countries, and thus the relevant fixed 
effects or the clustering of standard errors should capture any related impact on our estimates. 
Indeed, we document minimal changes in the results vis-à-vis the baseline.  
 Subsequently, we refine the loan facilities included in the sample according to their 
type and purpose. In columns (3) and (4) we exclude all loans other than term and revolver 
loans, which are the most conventional corporate loan deals. In columns (5) and (6) we exclude 
loans for leveraged buyouts (LBOs) or mergers and acquisitions (M&As) because these can 
lower the cost of credit by reducing the asymmetric information between the bank and the 
borrowing firm (Ivashina and Kovner, 2011).15 In principle, the loan-type and loan-purpose 
fixed effects used in the previous analysis should capture such discrepancies in loan pricing. 
Again, the results from these exercises are similar to the baseline. 
 The remaining sensitivity tests represent alternative specifications for the ones reported 
earlier. First, we control for differences in the macroeconomic, financial, and institutional 
environment between the lenders’ and borrowers’ countries. These variables (defined in Table 
A1) should correlate strongly with the country-pair × year fixed effects in column (5) of Table 
3. However, using too many fixed effects might cloud inferences so that we should at least 
verify that our results hold when using country-pair controls (differences in country-year 
variables between the lenders’ and borrowers’ countries) instead. We do not use all indicators 
at once, because they tend to have high pairwise correlations. For definitions of these variables, 
see Table A1. 
 In Table A11, we use macroeconomic and financial market country-pair controls. We 
initially consider GDP per capita and GDP growth and sequentially add different controls. The 
results (columns 1 to 4) confirm the sign and size of the coefficient on Forex risk × Different 
                                                 
15 The cost of credit might be lower because the bank has private information about the borrowing firm from prior 
transactions, which might, for example, enhance its confidence in the firm’s due-diligence process. 
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currency. When we consider a reduced sample due to data availability (columns 5 to 8), the 
interaction effect is even stronger. The estimates of these controls are intuitive. For example, 
the larger the difference in GDP per capita between the country of the lender and the country 
of the borrower, the larger the loan spread.  
Next, we control for differences in institutional quality characteristics. These 
characteristics matter for the functioning of financial markets in general (e.g., Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005) and the pricing of loans in particular (Delis, Hasan, and Ongena, 2017). We 
consequently expect borrower countries that lag behind lender countries in institutional 
development to experience higher loan spreads for their firms. 
Again, due to collinearity of our indicators of institutional democracy with the rest of 
institutional variables, we adopt Imputed polity as the benchmark institutional control and 
consider additional controls henceforth. Being a dichotomous indicator, Imputed polity is ideal 
for identification purposes, as a change from 0 to 1 sends a strong signal to banks and thus 
alters the information content used to price risk. The results in columns (1) to (8) of Table A12 
confirm our expectations, because a one-point difference in Imputed polity between the country 
of the lender and the country of the borrower raises spreads by approximately 40 basis points. 
For all specifications, the coefficient on Forex risk × Different currency is statistically 
significant at conventional levels and takes values within the 33-38 basis points range. 
Further, to make sure that our inferences are not sensitive to the type of clustering (also 
given the multilevel nature of our data), we also cluster standard errors by loan facility, bank, 
firm, and by bank and firm and year (see Table A13). We note that the results are also robust 
to the clustering of standard error by lender country or by lender country and borrower country 
(results available on request). 
Last, acknowledging the arguments on the link between exchange rates and 
macroeconomic fundamentals arising in a present value model of exchange rates (e.g., Sarno 
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and Schmeling, 2014), we test whether various macro fundamentals drive our results. To this 
end, we estimate specifications without bank × year fixed effects and include combinations of 
specific macro variables that matter most for exchange rates, such as GDP growth, money 
growth, the inflation rate (level and change), and the real interest rate. Columns (1) to (4) of 
Table A14 show that although including these variables reduces the number of observations, 
the coefficient on Forex risk × Different currency is still significant at the 1% level and within 
the range suggested by the previous estimations.  
 
5. Understanding our results 
The results in Section 4 provide evidence of differential loan pricing between firms borrowing 
in their bank’s currency and firms borrowing in their own domestic currency. This differential 
pricing should in theory be eliminated in the presence of uncovered interest rate parity, i.e., if 
agents are risk neutral and form rational expectations, implying that they are indifferent with 
respect to the currency of denomination, in which case interest rate differentials across 
countries are exactly offset by expected future changes in exchange rates. If agents are risk 
averse and thus uncovered interest rate parity does not hold, however, banks should be able to 
hedge foreign exchange risk. In this case, the extra margin imposed in foreign currency lending 
should, in a competitive market for lending, be equal to the cost of hedging. Our results show 
that currency denomination constitutes an important determinant of foreign-currency loan 
pricing. Having established that, in this section we perform a number of tests to better 
understand the reasons behind our findings and, more generally, the heterogeneity of loan 
pricing differentials across countries and currencies.16 
 
                                                 
16 For expositional purposes, all tables in Section 5 present results only from specifications with both firm × year 
and bank × year fixed effects. 
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5.1. Currency hedging 
To examine this possibility, we consider that the cost of hedging should be related to the cost 
of trading in a suitable currency derivative contract. Therefore, differentials in loan prices 
should be higher for currencies that have higher trading costs, i.e. lower liquidity. We consider 
the bid-ask spread on forward contracts as a proxy of the trading cost of such hedging of 
currency risk.17 Specifically, we control in equation (1) for the bid-ask spread, using either the 
bilateral 3- or 6-month forward exchange rate, and also interact it with Different currency. In 
essence, we assume that the cost of hedging a currency is proportional to its liquidity, as 
measured by the bid-ask spread. 
Results for the 3-month measure (column 1 of Table 9) show that the coefficient on the 
bid-ask spread is positive and statistically significant, implying a higher cost of credit for all 
loans when foreign exchange markets are less liquid. However, the estimate on the interaction 
term Bid-ask spread × Different currency is statistically insignificant, failing to reveal an 
heterogeneous effect when the loan facility is granted in the currency of the borrower's country. 
Using the triple interaction Forex risk × Bid-ask spread × Different currency (along with all 
the relevant main and double interactions) or measures based on the quoted spread (as in e.g., 
Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009) and the volatility of the bid-ask spread, again yields insignificant 
coefficient estimates. We conclude that differences in liquidity across currencies in the foreign 
exchange market, which usually translates into higher hedging costs, is associated with higher 
cost of credit but this is irrespective of the loan currency denomination or the effect of exchange 
rate risk on the cost of credit. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
                                                 
17 An alternative which we do not pursue would be to use relevant option prices but we are severely limited by 
their availability and low liquidity outside the large developed economies. 
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5.2. Level of economic development 
Our next step is to identify the set of countries in which our results prevail. We do so by 
examining the heterogeneity of our main finding due to specific country characteristics that 
potentially play an important role in determining the effect of exchange rate risk on the cost of 
credit. In column (2) of Table 9, we introduce the triple interaction term Forex risk × Different 
currency × Developed (along with all the relevant main and double interactions). The variable 
Developed is binary, taking the value one if GDP per capita is above our sample’s mean and 
the value zero below the mean.18 
The coefficients on the triple interaction and the double interaction are statistically 
insignificant, but adding them in the regression produces a statistically significant estimate 
(marginal effect) that is approximately equal to our baseline estimate. Importantly, the 
coefficient on the triple interaction shows that most of the effect comes from developed 
countries. Thus, these results imply that our finding is not related to country risk (already 
captured by other macroeconomic indicators) but should be related to other structural 
characteristics of the borrowers’ financial sector.  
 
5.3. Credit constraints and market competition 
Third, we consider the possibility that the firms’ decision to resort to international financing is 
related to credit constraints in the domestic loan market and related deviations from 
competition in the international lending market. If this is the case, we expect that the effect of 
exchange rate risk is higher when borrowers face higher domestic credit constraints. To test 
this hypothesis we introduce the triple interaction term between measures of credit constraints 
and Forex risk × Different currency (again along with all the relevant main and double 
                                                 
18 We use a binary variable for ease of interpretation of the estimates, but the results are qualitatively similar when 
using GDP per capita.  
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interactions). Following a vast literature, we measure credit constraints using the ratio of credit 
provided by banks over GDP (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2010; Manova, 2012). 
Similar to the analysis of developed vs. developing countries, we generate a dummy equal to 
one if credit by banks over GDP is above our sample mean and the value zero if it is below that 
mean (we name this variable Credit by banks). The results in column (3) of Table 9 suggest 
that the effect of exchange rate risk is less strong when Credit by banks equals one (lower credit 
constraints). 
 Naturally, this finding points to low banking market competition in lending as a 
candidate to affect the relation between exchange rate risk and the cost of credit. To examine 
the role of competition in more depth, we generate a bank-year measure of market power using 
the approach of Delis, Kokas, and Ongena (2017). The merit of this approach (thoroughly 
discussed in the Internet Appendix) is that it provides a Lerner index for each bank-year via 
the estimation of a non-parametric (fully flexible) functional form of the cost function. Then, 
similar to the rest of the specifications in Table 9, we use a triple interaction term including the 
Lerner index. The results (column 4) show that a one standard deviation increase in the Lerner 
index (equal to 0.2) implies an 8.6 basis points further increase in the cost of credit. Thus, the 
effect of exchange rate risk on the cost of credit is indeed stronger when lenders possess higher 
market power. 19 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 In a similar fashion to the analysis of Table 9, we consider the role of other country and firm characteristics on 
the relation between exchange rate risk and the cost of credit. For example, we consider the borrower country’s 
reliance on foreign-currency lending measured as the number of foreign loans in domestic currency to the total 
number of loans in that country. Further, we consider fixed vs. floating exchange rate regimes and countries with 
high vs. low interest rates (or high vs. low interest rate differentials between the lenders’ and borrowers’ 
countries). Even though these characteristics affect the cost of credit directly, they do not cause significant 
heterogeneity in the impact of exchange rate risk. 
29 
 
5.4. Relationship lending and loan structure 
Our results thus far highlight an important competitive disadvantage of firms borrowing in a 
currency different than their lender’s currency, which persists in a number of sensitivity tests 
and is stronger for firms in developed countries but with relatively low levels of credit provided 
by banks, as well as when lenders have higher market power. Naturally, these findings raise 
the question of whether the affected borrowers can do something to lower the extra cost of 
credit (that is besides being sound firms with profitable projects). In what follows, we focus on 
two potential strategies: the first considers forming ties between firms and banks via repeated 
lending (relationship lending); and the second considers the conditions of the particular loan 
contract and the loan syndicate’s structure.  
Previous lending between the lead bank and the firm implies that the bank gains 
important information about the specific borrowing firm (e.g., its ability to repay and its 
business model) as well as about the impact the exchange rate had on the value of the loan 
repayments in the lender’s currency. This, ceteris paribus, lowers the respective informational 
asymmetry, and one may expect that the bank is more willing to share some of the exchange 
rate risk with a borrowing firm that is a “repeat borrower” rather than transfer all of the 
exchange rate risk. To test this hypothesis, we introduce a triple interaction between 
Relationship lending (i.e., a dummy equal to one if the lead bank and the firm have at least one 
other loan in the last two years, see e.g., Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2009) and 
Forex risk × Different currency.  
 We report the results in the first column of Table 10. The coefficient on Forex risk × 
Different currency × Relationship lending shows that the borrower recovers approximately 
60% of the higher cost due to exchange rate risk. In economic terms this is translated into 
annual savings of USD 0.38 million (=$259,000,000 ×14.6 basis points) or a total of USD 1.85 
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million over the loan’s duration. Thus, the presence of a prior lending relationship results in 
the sharing of exchange rate risk between the lender and the borrower.  
 [Insert Table 10 about here] 
 The second strategy aiming to mitigate the effect of exchange rate risk on the cost of 
credit concerns the structure of the loan. Two ways to achieve this objective are the inclusion 
of tighter covenants to lower exchange rate risk and the addition of more syndicate members 
to spread the risk across more banks.  
Dealscan does not include information on covenants specific to exchange rate risk 
because, most probably, such covenants do not exist (for a full review of covenant categories, 
see Demiroglu and James, 2010; and Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang, 2014). However, it seems 
plausible that lending in a different currency might imply higher covenant intensity. Following 
Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2014), we measure total covenant intensity using the total number 
of covenants (financial and general covenants) and introduce a triple interaction term between 
this measure, Forex risk, and Different currency (as we did for Relationship lending in equation 
3). The results in column (3) of Table 10 show that the triple interaction is statistically 
insignificant. Repeating this analysis using specific loan covenants (e.g., the minimum current 
ratio covenant and the maximum debt to earnings covenant as in Demiroglu and James, 2010) 
does not affect the results. 
We conduct a similar analysis with the Number of lenders in a triple interaction term 
and report the results in column (4) of Table 10. As in the previous column, we document a 
statistically insignificant triple interaction. We additionally experiment with other variables on 
the setup of the loan contract and the structure of the syndicate (e.g., using performance pricing 
provisions and collateral, different loan size and maturity, different loan shares by the lead bank 
vis-à-vis participant banks), but we fail to find results indicative of a reduced impact of 
exchange rate risk on loan pricing. 
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5.5. Summing up 
Overall, the results in this section suggest that the international lending market is not a perfectly 
competitive market. It is rather characterized by heterogeneous loan spreads depending on the 
loan currency denomination and borrower credit constraints, even after controlling for loan 
contract terms and the operation of the loan supply and loan demand channels. Aggravated by 
price segmentation documented in the foreign exchange market (see Hau, Hoffmann, 
Langfield, and Timmer, 2017), imperfect competition in international lending markets results 
in divergent syndicated loan spreads when lenders are exposed to exchange rate risk. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The market for international lending in the borrower’s currency is large and growing. These 
cross-border loans imply considerable exchange rate risk for banks lending in a currency that 
is not their own. This study is the first to measure how this bank-side risk affects lending terms, 
and particularly the cost of credit, in a broad cross-section of firms.  
 Using global loan-level data from the syndicated loan market, we show that lenders 
place a significant cost on borrowers in foreign-currency lending. Our baseline specification 
suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in exchange rate risk increases loan spreads by 
approximately 20 basis points for loans made in a currency different from the lenders’ 
compared to those made in the lenders’ currency. These results are robust to several changes 
in the baseline specification and alternative estimation methods. 
The data also show that firms borrowing from foreign banks in their domestic currency 
are, on average, less risky than those borrowing in the banks’ domestic currency. Apart from 
implying that our baseline results are rather conservative, this reflects a cost of first-order 
importance for healthy firms facing credit constraints in their domestic banking markets. We 
calculate this additional cost of foreign-currency lending for the average loan size to be USD 
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0.52 million per year or USD 2.55 million when considering the average loan maturity. Thus, 
firms with no better financing alternatives have a significant competitive disadvantage 
compared to firms borrowing in their banks’ currency due to foreign exchange risk. 
With the aim to identify the factors affecting the relation between exchange rate risk 
and the cost of credit, we show the key role played by credit constraints and bank market power. 
Specifically, in countries with a high ratio of domestic credit provided by banks over GDP, the 
effect of exchange rate risk on the cost of credit is significantly weaker. In contrast, the same 
effect is significantly stronger as the market power of the bank lending in foreign currency 
increases. Is there a remedy against this excessive cost of credit and the associated competitive 
disadvantage of the affected firms? Among the remedies considered here, repeated lending 
with the same bank (formation of relationship lending) is the only one yielding significantly 
lower cost of credit and some degree of risk sharing between lending banks and borrowing 
firms. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable definitions are in Table A1. 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
AISD 107,751 261.15 174.10 -295.00 2,000.00 
AISU 31,118 37.42 28.49 0.25 750.00 
Forex risk 107,751 0.12 0.36 0.00 56.68 
Forex risk 1M 107,751 0.12 0.26 0.00 6.42 
Forex risk 6M 107,732 0.13 0.41 0.00 40.11 
3-month forward rate 3M 87,027 0.11 0.24 0.00 9.49 
3-month forward rate 6M 87,027 0.11 0.24 0.00 9.72 
6-month forward rate 3M 86,882 0.11 0.24 0.00 6.75 
6-month forward rate 6M 86,882 0.11 0.24 0.00 6.93 
Bid-ask spread 3M 86,568 33.72 625.57 0.00 27805.80 
Bid-ask spread 6M 86,568 33.83 627.57 0.00 27899.62 
Loan amount 107,751 18.07 1.67 9.12 24.62 
Maturity 107,751 58.49 35.73 0.00 1,140.00 
Collateral 107,751 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 107,751 7.21 8.02 1.00 290.00 
Performance provisions 107,751 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
General covenants 107,751 0.69 1.34 0.00 8.00 
Financial covenants 107,751 0.62 1.20 0.00 8.00 
Net covenants 107,751 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Relationship lending 107,751 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Return on assets 107,751 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.35 
NPLs 107,751 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.30 
RBC ratio 107,751 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.64 
Bank size 107,751 12.02 1.53 5.21 19.55 
Lerner index 92,360 0.27 0.20 -0.11 1.00 
GDP per capita 103,058 -2,084.06 10,269.21 -102,432.70 100,538.20 
GDP growth 103,055 0.08 1.55 -24.08 25.43 
Trade openness 103,010 2.25 49.98 -385.89 425.19 
Inflation 102,664 -0.41 11.67 -2,073.28 11.48 
Inflation change 86,557 -0.33 3.12 -152.43 10.02 
Trade balance 87,969 -283.12 11,579.23 -337,386.80 92,596.49 
Money growth 83,180 -0.67 9.63 -1,101.98 125.31 
Debt 58,482 0.92 19.28 -189.85 201.12 
Interest rate 100,435 -0.11 2.54 -70.43 41.64 
Stock market capitalization 98,914 -3.09 69.48 -1,193.27 271.30 
VIX 104,111 18.98 6.98 11.26 44.14 
Polity 102,443 0.14 0.97 -9.33 10.00 
Imputed polity 102,529 0.14 0.97 -9.33 10.00 
Business freedom 96,829 1.00 7.20 -61.90 61.70 
Economic freedom 96,829 0.90 5.57 -36.40 39.10 
Financial freedom 96,829 1.12 11.55 -60.00 60.00 
Fiscal freedom 96,829 -0.20 7.98 -61.30 50.60 
Monetary freedom 96,829 0.67 4.16 -21.90 86.80 
Trade freedom 96,829 0.62 4.43 -57.40 78.40 
Shadow rate 72,054 1.25 3.23 -7.38 6.55 
Shadow rate 3M 72,054 1.25 3.22 -7.03 6.54 
Developed (borrower) 103,363 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Credit by banks 101,313 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2. Differences between loans in the treatment and control groups 
The table reports summary statistics for key price and non-price loan terms and measures of exchange rate risk. All variables 
are defined in Table A1. Panel A includes observations where Different currency is equal to 0. Panel B includes observations 
where Different currency is equal to 1. Different currency equals 1 if the loan facility is granted in the currency of the 
borrower's country, which is different than the lender’s country, 0 otherwise. Panel C reports results from the mean-
comparison test for differences in the mean and standard deviation between observations in Panel A and Panel B. The*** mark 
denotes statistical significance at 1% level. 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
 
Panel A: Domestic currency loans and foreign currency loans granted in the lender’s currency  
 
AISD 91,727 257.08 169.33 -295.00 2,000.00 
AISU 27,917 36.73 27.86 0.25 750.00 
Forex risk 91,727 0.06 0.21 0.00 6.99 
Forex risk 1M 91,727 0.06 0.21 0.00 6.42 
Forex risk 6M 91,710 0.06 0.31 0.00 40.11 
Loan amount 91,727 18.00 1.68 9.12 24.62 
Maturity 91,727 56.80 34.50 0.00 1,140.00 
Collateral 91,727 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 91,727 7.17 8.00 1.00 290.00 
Performance provisions 91,727 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
General covenants 91,727 0.75 1.38 0.00 8.00 
 
Panel B: Foreign currency loans granted in the borrower’s currency 
 
AISD 16,024 284.39 197.62 -150.00 1,750.00 
AISU 3,201 43.49 32.88 0.35 425.00 
Forex risk 16,024 0.50 0.66 0.00 56.68 
Forex risk 1M 16,024 0.48 0.25 0.00 3.45 
Forex risk 6M 16,022 0.51 0.66 0.00 40.08 
Loan amount 16,024 18.48 1.51 10.88 24.20 
Maturity 16,024 68.17 40.73 1.00 515.00 
Collateral 16,024 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 16,024 7.44 8.12 1.00 161.00 
Performance provisions 16,024 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
General covenants 16,024 0.38 1.01 0.00 7.00 
 
Panel C: Mean-comparison test for the mean and standard deviation 
 
AISD  -27.31*** 1.66***   
AISU  -6.76*** 0.60***   
Forex risk  -0.44*** 0.01***   
Forex risk 1M  -0.43*** 0.00***   
Forex risk 6M  -0.44*** 0.01***   
Loan amount  -0.48*** 0.01***   
Maturity  -11.37*** 0.34***   
Collateral  -0.09*** 0.00***   
Number of lenders  -0.27*** 0.07***   
Performance provisions  0.07*** 0.00***   
General covenants  0.37*** 0.01***   
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Table 3. Baseline results with different fixed effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined 
in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. Each specification includes a 
different set of fixed effects, as given in the lower part of the table. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Forex risk 9.082 1.116 7.271 7.271 0.307 
 [1.146] [0.237] [1.048] [1.048] [0.032] 
Different currency -12.467** -13.848** -10.300** -10.300** -11.473** 
 [-2.405] [-2.289] [-2.194] [-2.194] [-2.296] 
Forex risk × Different currency 30.094*** 31.687*** 30.418*** 30.418*** 29.846** 
 [2.859] [4.433] [3.244] [3.244] [2.251] 
Loan amount -5.613*** -5.823*** -6.014*** -6.014*** -6.115*** 
 [-3.815] [-3.902] [-4.294] [-4.294] [-4.450] 
Maturity 0.651*** 0.670*** 0.703*** 0.703*** 0.697*** 
 [6.227] [6.339] [6.548] [6.548] [6.413] 
Collateral -7.355 -7.436 -9.456 -9.456 -9.744 
 [-1.085] [-1.180] [-1.356] [-1.356] [-1.285] 
Number of lenders -0.834*** -0.402*** -0.368** -0.368** -0.437** 
 [-4.129] [-3.315] [-2.426] [-2.426] [-2.201] 
Performance provisions -25.146*** -23.815*** -23.327*** -23.327*** -23.286*** 
 [-19.030] [-23.963] [-19.576] [-19.576] [-21.706] 
General covenants 3.670*** 2.983*** 2.563** 2.563** 2.109*** 
 [4.322] [4.273] [2.434] [2.434] [2.800] 
Return on assets -166.408*** -159.554***    
 [-12.942] [-13.496]    
NPLs 140.742*** 133.832***    
 [11.609] [11.640]    
RBC ratio 17.263*** 15.528***    
 [5.157] [4.243]    
Bank size -0.383* -0.262    
 [-1.972] [-1.245]    
Observations 110,574 109,667 107,751 107,751 107,100 
Adj. R-squared 0.757 0.770 0.766 0.762 0.754 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y N Y 
Bank effects N Y N N N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N N Y Y Y 
Country × year effects N N N Y N 
Country-pair × year effects N N N N Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country 
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Table 4. Alternative exchange rate risk measures 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are 
defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. Specifications 
(1) and (2) include the 1-month exchange rate risk measure and specifications (3) and (4) the 6-month 
equivalent. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, 
**, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forex risk 1M 0.287 3.004   
 [0.061] [0.529]   
Forex risk 6M   3.288 5.350 
   [1.120] [1.204] 
Different currency -12.588** -5.444 -14.974** -12.422* 
 [-2.242] [-1.270] [-2.170] [-1.768] 
Forex risk 1M × Different currency 30.169*** 22.890***   
 [3.304] [2.690]   
Forex risk 6M × Different currency   32.178*** 34.659*** 
   [4.356] [2.649] 
Loan amount -5.819*** -6.013*** -5.823*** -6.016*** 
 [-3.897] [-4.295] [-3.892] [-4.280] 
Maturity 0.670*** 0.702*** 0.670*** 0.702*** 
 [6.341] [6.546] [6.334] [6.541] 
Collateral -7.438 -9.453 -7.459 -9.459 
 [-1.177] [-1.356] [-1.183] [-1.358] 
Number of lenders -0.403*** -0.373** -0.404*** -0.372** 
 [-3.316] [-2.440] [-3.305] [-2.440] 
Performance provisions -23.826*** -23.327*** -23.780*** -23.258*** 
 [-23.551] [-19.335] [-23.331] [-19.251] 
General covenants 2.997*** 2.569** 2.985*** 2.561** 
 [4.343] [2.452] [4.290] [2.428] 
Return on assets -159.460***  -159.461***  
 [-13.477]  [-13.485]  
NPLs 133.614***  133.819***  
 [11.642]  [11.624]  
RBC ratio 15.456***  15.503***  
 [4.227]  [4.233]  
Bank size -0.264  -0.261  
 [-1.257]  [-1.239]  
Observations 109,675 107,757 109,639 107,729 
Adj. R-squared 0.770 0.766 0.770 0.766 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y N Y N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N Y N Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country 
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Table 5. Forward-looking exchange rate risk 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in 
Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The lower part of the table denotes the 
type of fixed effects used in each specification. Specifications (1) and (2) include the 3- and 6-month volatility 
respectively in the 3-month bilateral forward exchange rate between the lender’s country and the borrower’s country, 
and specifications (3) and (4) include the 3- and 6-month volatility respectively in the 6-month bilateral forward 
exchange rate between the lender’s country and the borrower’s country. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-month forward risk 3M 11.464*    
 [1.676]    
6-month forward risk 3M  10.067   
  [1.567]   
3-month forward risk 6M   9.682  
   [1.305]  
6-month forward rate 6M    8.779 
    [1.204] 
Different currency -6.338 -6.323 -11.248 -11.141 
 [-1.084] [-1.083] [-1.377] [-1.363] 
3-month forward rate 3M × Different currency 28.100**    
 [2.224]    
3-month forward rate 6M × Different currency  28.710**   
  [2.252]   
6-month forward rate 3M × Different currency   37.820**  
   [2.284]  
6-month forward rate 6M × Different currency    38.070** 
    [2.289] 
Loan amount -6.669*** -6.670*** -6.642*** -6.643*** 
 [-3.944] [-3.945] [-3.849] [-3.850] 
Maturity 0.855*** 0.855*** 0.855*** 0.855*** 
 [5.206] [5.206] [5.188] [5.188] 
Collateral -11.684 -11.682 -11.592 -11.594 
 [-1.426] [-1.426] [-1.419] [-1.419] 
Number of lenders -0.539** -0.539** -0.568** -0.568** 
 [-2.211] [-2.211] [-2.217] [-2.217] 
Performance provisions -23.408*** -23.409*** -23.482*** -23.483*** 
 [-19.590] [-19.593] [-19.810] [-19.816] 
General covenants 3.193*** 3.195*** 3.260*** 3.261*** 
 [2.802] [2.802] [2.789] [2.789] 
Observations 87,166 87,166 87,015 87,015 
Adj. R-squared 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country 
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Table 6. Different loan controls 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. 
Different specifications include different loan controls to show that the estimates on the term Forex risk × Different currency are not overly sensitive to the loan controls used. The lower part of the 
table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Forex risk 7.196 15.867** 1.126 7.351 7.271 15.834** 7.087 15.811** 
 [1.262] [2.012] [0.231] [1.050] [1.329] [2.056] [1.267] [2.035] 
Different currency -14.716** -8.257 -13.615** -9.666** -14.596** -8.172 -15.162** -9.127* 
 [-2.266] [-1.617] [-2.335] [-2.105] [-2.204] [-1.553] [-2.267] [-1.744] 
Forex risk × Different currency 30.825*** 24.746*** 31.081*** 29.445*** 31.205*** 24.688*** 31.600*** 26.296*** 
 [4.323] [3.314] [4.295] [3.143] [4.423] [3.364] [4.366] [3.516] 
Loan amount   -6.340*** -6.450***     
   [-4.218] [-4.591]     
Maturity   0.667*** 0.700***     
   [6.295] [6.489]     
Collateral     -7.087 -9.609   
     [-1.179] [-1.410]   
Number of lenders     -0.605*** -0.555***   
     [-5.707] [-4.182]   
Performance provisions       -24.576*** -24.055*** 
       [-20.472] [-18.995] 
General covenants       2.228*** 1.523*** 
       [6.305] [3.268] 
Return on assets -171.523***  -161.315***  -171.341***  -169.481***  
 [-13.035]  [-13.682]  [-12.934]  [-12.915]  
NPLs 140.786***  134.173***  140.790***  140.211***  
 [12.756]  [11.854]  [12.708]  [12.756]  
RBC ratio 20.872***  15.711***  20.743***  20.699***  
 [6.125]  [4.290]  [6.152]  [5.997]  
Bank size -0.281  -0.273  -0.268  -0.274  
 [-1.326]  [-1.310]  [-1.267]  [-1.278]  
Observations 115,078 113,126 109,667 107,751 115,078 113,126 115,078 113,126 
Adj. R-squared 0.758 0.753 0.770 0.766 0.758 0.754 0.758 0.754 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y N Y N Y N Y N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
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Table 7. Weighted least squares 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is weighted least squares with standard errors clustered by country. The lower part of the table denotes the 
type of fixed effects used in each specification. In specifications (1) and (2), weighting is by the number of loans from a given 
country in a given year to the total number of loans in that year. In specifications (3) and (4), weighting is by the number of loans 
between a given country-pair (the pair of the borrower and the lender countries) in a given year to the total number of loans in 
that year. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forex risk -0.712 5.430 -0.595 5.884 
 [-0.147] [0.787] [-0.123] [0.854] 
Different currency -11.948 -10.494*** -12.506 -11.138*** 
 [-1.558] [-2.673] [-1.637] [-2.805] 
Forex risk × Different currency 26.342*** 34.060*** 27.265*** 35.690*** 
 [3.493] [3.504] [3.631] [3.555] 
Loan amount -6.121*** -6.263*** -6.176*** -6.322*** 
 [-4.480] [-4.725] [-4.572] [-4.849] 
Maturity 0.731*** 0.774*** 0.725*** 0.768*** 
 [6.217] [6.672] [6.125] [6.577] 
Collateral -7.177 -8.996 -6.909 -8.723 
 [-1.272] [-1.385] [-1.267] [-1.389] 
Number of lenders -0.411*** -0.353** -0.408*** -0.347** 
 [-3.757] [-2.550] [-3.865] [-2.588] 
Performance provisions -23.508*** -22.837*** -23.384*** -22.688*** 
 [-38.002] [-38.186] [-38.446] [-38.887] 
General covenants 2.821*** 2.440** 2.782*** 2.363** 
 [3.920] [2.381] [4.003] [2.352] 
Return on assets -163.678***  -163.457***  
 [-14.777]  [-15.182]  
NPLs 132.525***  132.274***  
 [12.576]  [12.882]  
RBC ratio 15.091***  15.007***  
 [3.972]  [3.949]  
Bank size -0.180  -0.177  
 [-1.036]  [-1.034]  
Observations 109,667 107,751 109,667 107,751 
Adj. R-squared 0.770 0.766 0.770 0.766 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y N Y N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N Y N Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country 
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Table 8. Results for AISU 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent 
variable is AISU. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors 
clustered by country. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed 
effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
 AISU AISU 
Forex risk 0.168 0.949 
 [0.047] [0.235] 
Different currency -0.987 0.099 
 [-0.567] [0.053] 
Forex risk × Different currency -1.944 -3.759 
 [-0.566] [-1.039] 
Loan amount -0.840*** -0.672*** 
 [-12.628] [-7.982] 
Maturity 0.034*** 0.039** 
 [3.156] [2.447] 
Collateral 2.829*** 1.863*** 
 [10.352] [6.445] 
Number of lenders 0.015 0.040* 
 [1.088] [1.781] 
Performance provisions -2.845*** -3.056*** 
 [-7.513] [-8.622] 
General covenants 0.565*** 0.715*** 
 [3.072] [4.252] 
Return on assets -5.578  
 [-1.519]  
NPLs 2.813  
 [0.990]  
RBC ratio 0.556  
 [0.532]  
Bank size 0.053*  
 [1.707]  
Observations 17,593 17,103 
Adj. R-squared 0.807 0.821 
Loan type Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y 
Country effects Y Y 
Bank effects Y N 
Firm × year effects Y Y 
Bank × year effects N Y 
Clustering Country Country 
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Table 9. Results heterogeneity due to country characteristics and bank market power   
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in 
Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The lower part of the table denotes the 
type of fixed effects and control variables used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forex risk 16.164** -5.855 -2.474 4.052 
 [2.122] [-0.978] [-0.366] [0.692] 
Different currency -8.522 -5.575 -0.998 -13.390*** 
 [-1.366] [-0.690] [-0.208] [-3.077] 
Forex risk × Different currency 25.527** 3.515 45.800*** 31.770*** 
 [2.078] [0.298] [4.150] [3.343] 
Bid-ask spread 0.036***    
  [4.188]    
Bid-ask spread × Different currency -0.000    
  [-0.335]    
Forex risk × Different currency × Developed country  26.413   
  [1.575]   
Forex risk × Different currency × Credit by banks    -30.644*  
   [-1.862]  
Forex risk × Different currency × Lerner index    43.056*** 
   [2.874] 
Observations 86,167 107,751 107,751 92,360 
Adj. R-squared 0.762 0.766 0.766 0.770 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y 
Main terms and double interactions Y Y Y Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country 
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Table 10. Results heterogeneity due to lending relationships and loan characteristics 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined 
in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The lower part of the table 
denotes the type of fixed effects and control variables used in each specification. In specification (1), we interact 
Forex risk × Different currency with Relationship lending, i.e., a dummy variable equal to 1 for a prior lending 
relationship between lender and borrower during the previous 2-year period, otherwise zero. The *, **, and *** 
marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Forex risk 7.366 10.500* 5.619 
  [0.974] [1.685] [0.907] 
Different currency -13.069** -5.280 -7.822 
  [-2.220] [-1.360] [-1.579] 
Forex risk × Different currency 36.560*** 28.513*** 24.591*** 
  [3.393] [2.772] [2.676] 
Forex risk × Different currency × Relationship lending -22.063**   
  [-2.095]   
Forex risk × Different currency × General covenants  -2.475  
   [-0.207]  
Forex risk × Different currency × Number of lenders   -1.373 
    [-0.753] 
Relationship -0.399 -1.699 -1.705 
  [-0.407] [-0.781] [-0.764] 
Forex risk × Relationship -0.561   
  [-0.130]   
Different currency × Relationship 9.464   
  [0.801]   
FC relationship    
     
Forex risk × FC Relationship    
     
Different currency × FC Relationship    
     
Forex risk × General covenants  9.982*  
   [1.736]  
Different currency × General covenants  -4.380  
   [-0.700]  
Forex risk × Number of lenders   0.048 
    [0.154] 
Different currency × Number of lenders   -0.738 
    [-1.001] 
Observations 107,751 107,751 107,751 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.766 0.766 
Loan type Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y 
Clustering Country Country Country 
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Figure 1. Aggregate syndicated loan volume 
The figure reports the annual aggregate volumes for foreign currency-denominated loans in the currency of the 
borrower (foreign currency lending), foreign currency-denominated loans in the currency of the lender (foreign 
currency borrowing) and domestic loans. Values for foreign currency lending and foreign currency borrowing are 
depicted on the left Y-axis and values for domestic loans are depicted on the right Y-axis. All values are in billion 
USD. 
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Internet Appendix 
Foreign currency lending 
 
 
Abstract 
The first section includes information on the construction of the sample and additional 
summary statistics. The second section reports (i) standardized coefficients of our baseline 
results, (ii) estimates from the Heckman regressions, and (iii) several additional sensitivity 
tests.  The appendix concludes with the description of the methodology for the calculation of 
the Lerner index.
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Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable  Description Source 
   
A. Dependent variables in main specifications 
AISD All-in-spread-drawn, defined as the sum of the spread over LIBOR plus any facility 
fee. 
DealScan 
AISU  All-in-spread-undrawn, defined as the sum of the facility fee and the commitment fee. DealScan 
 
B. Main explanatory variables: Exchange rate risk 
Forex risk The standard deviation of the daily (percentage) change in the bilateral exchange rate 
between the country of the lender and the country of the borrower. The standard 
deviation is computed for the 3 months preceding the loan facility’s origination date. 
Datastream 
Forex risk 1M The standard deviation of the daily (percentage) change in the bilateral exchange rate 
between the country of the lender and the country of the borrower. The standard 
deviation is computed for the 1 month preceding the loan facility’s origination date. 
Datastream 
 
Forex risk 6M The standard deviation of the daily (percentage) change in the bilateral exchange rate 
between the country of the lender and the country of the borrower. The standard 
deviation is computed for the 6 months preceding the loan facility’s origination date. 
Datastream 
 
3-month forward rate 3M The standard deviation of the daily (percentage) change in the bilateral 3-month 
forward exchange rate between the country of the lender and the country of the 
borrower. The standard deviation is computed for the 3 months preceding the loan 
facility’s origination date. The 6M rate is the equivalent measure computed for the 6 
months preceding the loan facility’s origination date. 
Datastream 
 
6-month forward rate 3M The standard deviation of the daily (percentage) change in the bilateral 6-month 
forward exchange rate between the country of the lender and the country of the 
borrower. The standard deviation is computed for the 3 months preceding the loan 
facility’s origination date.  The 6M rate is the equivalent measure computed for the 6 
months preceding the loan facility’s origination date. 
Datastream 
 
Bid-ask spread 3M The bid-ask spread for the bilateral 6-month forward exchange rate between the 
country of the lender and the country of the borrower. The bid-ask spread is computed 
as 𝑎𝑠𝑘 − 𝑏𝑖𝑑, where 𝑎𝑠𝑘 is the offered rate and 𝑏𝑖𝑑 is the bid rate in the 6-month 
forward contract. The 6M rate is the equivalent measure computed for the 6 months 
preceding the loan facility’s origination date. 
Datastream 
 
   
C. Explanatory variables: Loan characteristics 
Different currency A dummy variable equal to one if the loan facility is granted in the currency of the 
borrower's country, which is different than the lender’s country (zero otherwise). 
DealScan 
Loan amount Log of the loan facility amount in USD. DealScan 
Maturity  Loan duration in months. DealScan 
Collateral Dummy equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral, zero otherwise. DealScan 
Number of lenders The number of banks involved in the syndicated loan. DealScan 
Performance provisions Dummy equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions, zero otherwise. DealScan 
General covenants The total number of covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Financial covenants The number of financial covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Net covenants The number of net covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Loan type A series of dummy variables indicating loan type (e.g., term loans, revolvers, etc.). DealScan 
Loan purpose A series of dummy variables indicating loan purpose (e.g., corporate purpose, debt 
repay, etc.). 
DealScan 
Relationship lending Dummy equal to one for a prior loan facility between the lender and the borrower in 
the 2-year period before the loan facility’s origination year, zero otherwise. 
DealScan 
 
   
D. Explanatory variables: Lender characteristics  
Return on assets The return on total bank assets. Compustat 
NPLs The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Compustat 
RBC ratio The ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. Compustat 
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Bank size The log of total bank assets. Compustat 
Lerner index The Lerner index of the bank, which equals (p-mc/p), where p is the average lending 
rate given by each bank in each year and mc is the marginal cost of producing bank 
output (also at the bank-year). We proxy the lending rate from the ratio of interest 
income to total commercial loans and we estimate the marginal cost from the non-
parametric estimation of a cost function. We provide more details at the end of this 
Appendix. 
Compustat and 
own estimations 
   
E. Explanatory variables: Differences between the lender and borrower countries 
GDP per capita The difference in annual GDP per capita in constant prices between the lender’s and 
the borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
GDP growth The difference in annual GDP growth rate (%) between the lender’s and the borrower’s 
countries. 
WDI 
 
Trade openness The difference in annual trade openness between the lender’s and the borrower’s 
countries. Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services over 
GDP. 
WDI 
 
Trade balance Annual trade balance between the lender’s and the borrower’s countries (in millions 
USD). Trade balance is calculated as (exports of lender’s country/exports of 
borrower’s country)-(imports of lender’s country/imports of borrower’s country). 
OECD 
 
Inflation The difference in annual inflation (%), as measured by the consumer prices index, 
between the lender’s and the borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
Inflation change The difference in changes in annual inflation (%), as measured by the consumer price 
index, between the lender’s and the borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
Interest rate The difference in the annual real interest rate (%) between the lender’s and the 
borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
Money growth The difference in annual broad (M3) money growth (%) in constant prices between the 
lender’s and the borrower’s countries. 
OECD 
Debt The difference in annual government gross debt (as % of GDP) between the lender’s 
and the borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
Stock market 
capitalization 
The difference in the ratio of annual stock market capitalization to GDP (%) between 
the lender’s and the borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
VIX The Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX Index). The VIX index 
measures the implied volatility of options on the S&P 500. 
Bloomberg; 
CBOE 
Polity Difference in polity score between the lender’s and the borrower’s countries. The 
polity score is the average of freedom house and the combined polity score. The 
freedom house is the average of the political rights index and the civil liberties index. 
The combined polity score is computed by subtracting the autocracy score (an eleven 
point autocracy scale) from the democracy score (an eleven point democracy score). 
The resulting unified polity scale for Polity ranges from 10 (most democratic) to 0 
(least democratic). 
Polity IV Project 
(2016) 
The Quality of 
Government 
Institute 
Imputed polity Difference in imputed polity score between the country of the lender and the country 
of the borrower. The imputed version of Polity has imputed values for countries where 
data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on freedom house measure, i.e., the 
average of the political rights index and the civil liberties index (Hadenius and Teorell, 
2007; Teorell et al., 2017). The imputed polity scale for Imputed polity ranges from 10 
(most democratic) to 0 (least democratic). 
Polity IV Project 
(2016); 
The Quality of 
Government 
Institute 
Business freedom The annual difference in the business freedom index between the country of the lender 
and the country of the borrower. The business freedom score is composed of 10 
freedom indices converted to a scale ranging from 100 (maximum degree of business 
freedom) to 0 (minimum degree of business freedom). 
WDI; The Quality 
of Government 
Institute 
Economic freedom The annual difference in the economic freedom index between the country of the lender 
and the country of the borrower. The economic freedom index is composed of ten 
equally weighted components converted to a scale ranging from 100 (maximum degree 
of economic freedom) to 0 (minimum degree of economic freedom). 
WDI; The Quality 
of Government 
Institute 
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Financial freedom The annual difference in the financial freedom index between the country of the lender 
and the country of the borrower. The financial freedom index measures the relative 
openness of each country's banking and financial system on a scale ranging from 100 
(maximum degree of financial freedom) to 0 (minimum degree of financial freedom). 
WDI; The Quality 
of Government 
Institute 
Fiscal freedom The annual difference in the fiscal freedom index between the country of the lender 
and the country of the borrower. The fiscal freedom index is composed of 3 equally 
weighted components converted to a scale ranging from 100 (maximum degree of 
fiscal freedom) to 0 (minimum degree of fiscal freedom). 
WDI; The Quality 
of Government 
Institute 
Monetary freedom The annual difference in the monetary freedom index between the country of the lender 
and the country of the borrower. The monetary freedom index is composed of two 
equally weighted components converted to a scale ranging from 100 (maximum degree 
of monetary freedom) to 0 (minimum degree of monetary freedom). 
WDI; The Quality 
of Government 
Institute 
Trade freedom The annual difference in the trade freedom index between the country of the lender and 
the country of the borrower. The trade freedom score is composed of two equally 
weighted components converted to a scale ranging from 100 (maximum degree of trade 
freedom) to 0 (minimum degree of trade freedom). 
WDI; The Quality 
of Government 
Institute 
 
F. Explanatory variables:  Lender’s monetary policy stance 
Shadow rate The monthly shadow short rate in the Eurozone, Japan, the UK, and the U.S. (Krippner, 
2016). The 3M rate is the equivalent quarterly rate. 
Krippner (2016) 
   
   
G. Explanatory variables: Borrower’s credit constraints 
Developed Dummy equal to one if GDP per capita in the country of the borrower is above the 
mean in our sample, zero otherwise. 
WDI 
Credit by banks Dummy equal to one if domestic credit to private sector provided by banks (as % of 
GDP) in the country of the borrower is above the mean in our sample, zero otherwise. 
WDI 
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Table A2. Summary statistics by country-year 
The table reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values obtained from 
collapsing the loan-level sample by country and year. All variables are defined in Table A1. 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
AISD 1,160 170.37 104.08 10.33 642.11 
AISU 851 40.52 34.05 3.75 312.50 
Forex risk 1,160 0.36 0.36 0.01 5.28 
Forex risk 1M 1,160 0.35 0.35 0.01 6.22 
Forex risk 6M 1,160 0.38 0.43 0.01 8.66 
3-month forward rate 3M 960 0.26 1.06 0.00 32.35 
3-month forward rate 6M 960 0.27 1.07 0.00 32.59 
6-month forward rate 3M 960 0.27 0.96 0.00 24.44 
6-month forward rate 6M 960 0.28 0.97 0.00 24.78 
Bid-ask spread 3M 967 217.94 1545.27 0.00 26700.23 
Bid-ask spread 6M 967 218.82 1550.79 0.00 26779.29 
Loan amount 1,160 18.87 0.74 15.93 21.48 
Maturity 1,160 62.50 26.56 9.05 264.00 
Collateral 1,160 0.28 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 1,160 12.97 6.34 1.00 49.23 
Performance provisions 1,160 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.83 
General covenants 1,160 0.13 0.30 0.00 2.45 
Financial covenants 1,160 0.11 0.26 0.00 1.95 
Net covenants 1,160 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.56 
Relationship lending 1,160 0.12 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Return on assets 1,160 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 
NPLs 1,160 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 
RBC ratio 1,160 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.16 
Bank size 1,160 12.03 0.17 10.33 12.85 
GDP per capita 1,130 -9,501.04 18,411.70 -52,435.67 64,190.49 
GDP growth 1,129 0.92 2.79 -12.67 22.21 
Trade openness 1,119 14.71 55.01 -89.95 340.39 
Inflation 1,095 -4.21 52.60 -1,716.01 64.74 
Inflation change 916 -2.99 9.63 -153.01 4.69 
Trade balance 1,056 -2,005.29 9,422.07 -76,357.68 24,923.11 
Money growth 825 -6.51 32.13 -827.34 135.23 
Debt 826 13.64 24.13 -100.39 75.74 
Interest rate 970 -1.01 6.72 -67.63 39.77 
Stock market capitalization 908 8.31 75.12 -738.63 278.68 
VIX 1,138 19.92 6.00 11.56 43.97 
Polity 1,067 0.94 1.85 -2.28 8.18 
Imputed polity 1,050 0.96 1.86 -2.28 8.18 
Business freedom 1,015 5.68 10.62 -23.84 51.50 
Economic freedom 1,015 3.64 7.18 -15.18 27.82 
Financial freedom 1,015 4.87 13.42 -29.36 50.32 
Fiscal freedom 1,015 -6.78 11.06 -42.79 23.55 
Monetary freedom 1,015 4.44 10.00 -9.05 82.05 
Trade freedom 1,015 4.12 9.15 -7.45 72.71 
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Table A3. Number of loans and mean and standard deviation of 
Forex risk by country 
The table reports the number of observations (loan facilities), and the mean and 
standard deviation of Forex risk by country. 
Country Obs. 
Mean of  
Forex risk 
Std. Dev. of 
Forex risk 
Argentina 158 0.38 0.83 
Australia 2,060 0.21 0.33 
Austria 72 0.17 0.25 
Bahamas 14 0.56 0.26 
Bahrain 17 0.36 0.30 
Belarus 10 0.42 0.06 
Belgium 327 0.26 0.29 
Bermuda 88 0.52 0.13 
Brazil 176 0.77 0.43 
Bulgaria 22 0.09 0.13 
Cambodia 2 0.11 0.00 
Canada 1,850 0.31 0.28 
Cayman Islands 20 0.31 0.22 
Chile 103 0.48 0.31 
China 293 0.37 0.78 
Colombia 36 0.67 0.31 
Croatia 16 0.27 0.17 
Cyprus 18 0.31 0.22 
Czech Republic 72 0.38 0.23 
Denmark 172 0.21 0.23 
Egypt 43 0.61 0.20 
Estonia 6 0.39 0.31 
Finland 159 0.36 0.29 
France 3,241 0.16 0.24 
Germany 2,352 0.20 0.28 
Ghana 2 0.24 0.00 
Greece 154 0.26 0.31 
Hong Kong 1,081 0.42 0.28 
Hungary 88 0.50 0.25 
Iceland 52 0.69 0.83 
India 503 0.31 0.28 
Indonesia 381 0.37 0.41 
Ireland 346 0.27 0.28 
Israel 32 0.36 0.23 
Italy 1,111 0.15 0.25 
Jamaica 8 0.10 0.03 
Japan 1,007 0.06 0.20 
Kazakhstan 69 0.37 0.26 
Kenya 7 0.60 0.22 
Korea (South) 1,335 0.27 0.44 
Kuwait 18 0.13 0.18 
Laos 2 3.60 0.00 
Latvia 10 0.09 0.06 
Lithuania 8 0.13 0.24 
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Luxembourg 329 0.36 0.29 
Macau 25 0.39 0.26 
Malaysia 131 0.40 0.32 
Mali 3 0.47 0.00 
Malta 9 0.17 0.25 
Mauritius 8 0.58 0.15 
Mexico 410 0.60 0.41 
Mongolia 5 0.88 0.00 
Netherlands 1,484 0.35 2.09 
New Zealand 107 0.45 0.23 
Nigeria 10 0.31 0.18 
Norway 250 0.47 0.33 
Oman 16 0.40 0.22 
Pakistan 10 0.25 0.20 
Panama 6 0.51 0.18 
Peru 23 0.47 0.23 
Philippines 118 0.46 0.47 
Poland 118 0.52 0.25 
Portugal 147 0.32 0.37 
Qatar 32 0.31 0.30 
Romania 34 0.45 0.33 
Russia 434 0.44 0.32 
Saudi Arabia 74 0.22 0.28 
Singapore 595 0.35 0.23 
Slovak Republic 20 0.58 0.46 
Slovenia 24 0.19 0.21 
South Africa 147 0.67 0.38 
Spain 1,866 0.15 0.25 
Sri Lanka 7 0.46 0.31 
Sweden 483 0.44 0.21 
Switzerland 514 0.52 0.34 
Taiwan 4,356 0.02 0.11 
Thailand 131 0.39 0.41 
Trinidad and Tobago 2 0.67 0.00 
Tunisia 4 0.27 0.04 
Turkey 636 0.82 0.64 
USA 71,754 0.05 0.17 
Ukraine 58 0.52 0.29 
United Arab Emirates 162 0.33 0.33 
United Kingdom 5,620 0.33 0.27 
Venezuela 24 0.19 0.18 
Vietnam 22 0.51 0.20 
Zambia 2 0.40 0.00 
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Table A4. Number of loans and mean and standard deviation of 
Forex risk by country of foreign-currency lending 
The table reports the number of observations (loan facilities), and the mean and 
standard deviation of Forex risk by country. We consider only countries to which 
there is foreign currency lending (banks lend in foreign currency to firms in these 
countries).  
Country Obs. 
Mean of  
Forex risk 
Std. Dev. of 
Forex risk 
Australia 400 0.62 0.22 
Austria 21 0.53 0.10 
Belgium 132 0.52 0.19 
Brazil 2 0.62 0.00 
Canada 276 0.50 0.21 
China 12 0.31 0.18 
Colombia 1 0.37  
Czech Republic 26 0.47 0.19 
Denmark 39 0.30 0.19 
Egypt 1 0.53  
Finland 109 0.42 0.28 
France 946 0.45 0.17 
Germany 841 0.46 0.24 
Greece 26 0.49 0.16 
Hong Kong 713 0.44 0.28 
India 24 0.52 0.07 
Indonesia 21 0.47 0.55 
Ireland 55 0.50 0.17 
Italy 302 0.49 0.21 
Japan 36 0.67 0.26 
Korea (South) 12 0.54 0.08 
Luxembourg 109 0.43 0.18 
Malaysia 10 0.57 0.26 
Mexico 22 0.56 0.24 
Netherlands 524 0.69 3.47 
New Zealand 67 0.52 0.18 
Norway 75 0.54 0.29 
Philippines 12 0.40 0.17 
Poland 53 0.55 0.24 
Portugal 49 0.68 0.28 
Russia 11 0.51 0.09 
Saudi Arabia 6 0.12 0.17 
Singapore 190 0.42 0.22 
Slovenia 5 0.36 0.21 
South Africa 10 0.87 0.11 
Spain 530 0.46 0.21 
Sweden 186 0.46 0.18 
Switzerland 99 0.62 0.30 
Taiwan 147 0.48 0.24 
Thailand 15 0.47 0.22 
USA 7,385 0.50 0.21 
United Arab Emirates 10 0.27 0.47 
United Kingdom 2,514 0.48 0.17 
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Table A5. Standardized coefficients of baseline results 
The table reports standardized coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) for the baseline results reported in Table 3. 
Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard 
errors clustered by country. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the lower part 
of the table. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Forex risk 0.062 0.008 0.049 0.049 0.002 
 [1.146] [0.237] [1.048] [1.048] [0.032] 
Different currency -0.085** -0.094** -0.070** -0.070** -0.078** 
 [-2.405] [-2.289] [-2.194] [-2.194] [-2.296] 
Forex risk × Different currency 0.205*** 0.216*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.203** 
 [2.859] [4.433] [3.244] [3.244] [2.251] 
Loan amount -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.067*** 
 [-3.815] [-3.902] [-4.294] [-4.294] [-4.450] 
Maturity 0.182*** 0.187*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.195*** 
 [6.227] [6.339] [6.548] [6.548] [6.413] 
Collateral -0.024 -0.024 -0.030 -0.030 -0.031 
 [-1.085] [-1.180] [-1.356] [-1.356] [-1.285] 
Number of lenders -0.075*** -0.036*** -0.033** -0.033** -0.039** 
 [-4.129] [-3.315] [-2.426] [-2.426] [-2.201] 
Performance provisions -0.065*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
 [-19.030] [-23.963] [-19.576] [-19.576] [-21.706] 
General covenants 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.020** 0.020** 0.017*** 
 [4.322] [4.273] [2.434] [2.434] [2.800] 
Return on assets -0.025*** -0.024***    
 [-12.942] [-13.496]    
NPLs 0.022*** 0.021***    
 [11.609] [11.640]    
RBC ratio 0.007*** 0.006***    
 [5.157] [4.243]    
Bank size -0.004* -0.003    
 [-1.972] [-1.245]    
Observations 110,574 109,667 107,751 107,751 107,100 
Adj. R-squared 0.757 0.770 0.766 0.762 0.754 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y N Y 
Bank effects N Y N N N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N N Y Y Y 
Country × year effects N N N Y N 
Country-pair × year effects N N N N Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country 
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Table A6. Effect of foreign exchange risk on other loan characteristics 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is 
denoted in the second line of the table and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The lower part of 
the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** 
marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) 
Loan 
amount 
(2) 
Loan 
amount 
(3) 
Maturity 
(4) 
Maturity 
Forex risk -0.109* -0.158* -0.092 -2.097** 
 [-1.789] [-1.929] [-0.099] [-2.159] 
Different currency -0.045 -0.029 1.093 1.55 
 [-0.749] [-0.338] [1.394] [1.626] 
Forex risk × Different currency 0.188* 0.185 -2.341 -1.349 
 [1.899] [1.450] [-1.423] [-0.822] 
AISD -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 
 [-3.431] [-3.640] [3.512] [3.647] 
Loan amount   2.055*** 1.993*** 
   [4.008] [3.653] 
Maturity 0.005*** 0.005***   
 [12.499] [12.347]   
Collateral 0.007 0.013 1.948*** 1.585*** 
 [0.319] [0.720] [5.300] [4.165] 
Number of lenders 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.045 0.043 
 [8.391] [6.176] [1.374] [1.159] 
Performance provisions 0.259*** 0.260*** 1.042 1.218 
 [15.660] [15.637] [1.523] [1.654] 
General covenants -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.407** -0.521*** 
 [-3.537] [-3.103] [-2.570] [-2.651] 
Return on assets 0.020  0.652  
 [0.256]  [0.317]  
NPLs -0.060  3.597*  
 [-0.631]  [1.903]  
RBC ratio -0.092**  2.191**  
 [-2.064]  [2.184]  
Bank size 0.004**  -0.014  
 [2.248]  [-0.324]  
Observations 109,667 107,751 109,667 107,751 
Adj. R-squared 0.746 0.736 0.773 0.769 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y N Y N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N Y N Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country 
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Table A7. Heckman sample-selection model 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from Heckman’s (1979) sample-selection model. The 
dependent variable is in the second line of each panel and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method 
is maximum likelihood. The lower part of each panel denotes the dummy variables used in each specification. In 
the first stage (panel A), we use a probit model on the entire sample of loan facilities to estimate the determinants 
of the firm’s decision to use foreign-currency lending. In the second stage (panel B), we run the regression on the 
subsample of foreign-currency loan facilities (i.e., when Different currency is equal to 1). In Panel B, standard 
errors are clustered by country. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Panel A: The foreign currency loan-taking decision by the firm 
 
 
(1) 
Different currency 
(2) 
Different currency 
(3) 
Different currency 
Firm return on assets -0.073*** -0.104*** -0.052 
 [-4.514] [-2.906] [-1.390] 
Firm size -0.136** -0.132*** -0.129*** 
 [-2.250] [-2.739] [-2.577] 
Tobins’ Q -0.106**   
 [-2.167]   
Tangibility  0.000  
  [0.240]  
Leverage   0.029 
   [1.234] 
Loan amount 0.120** 0.141** 0.150** 
 [2.338] [2.333] [2.568] 
Maturity -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 
 [-1.582] [-0.845] [-0.280] 
Collateral 0.450*** 0.321*** 0.342*** 
 [7.373] [6.035] [5.912] 
Number of lenders 0.007 -0.008 -0.010 
 [1.210] [-1.212] [-1.525] 
Performance provisions 0.324*** 0.253*** 0.243*** 
 [4.050] [3.217] [3.141] 
General covenants 0.045 -0.041* -0.032 
 [1.199] [-1.927] [-1.611] 
Return on assets  0.224 0.157 
  [0.312] [0.224] 
NPLs  -0.154 0.261 
  [-0.286] [0.533] 
RBC ratio  0.177 0.123 
  [1.028] [0.703] 
Bank size  -0.014 -0.011 
  [-1.283] [-1.130] 
Country-pair loans -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 [-3.890] [-3.207] [-3.046] 
Bank loans -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [-0.077] [-0.056] [-0.397] 
Total loans   0.000 
   [1.578] 
Constant -22.148 -49.536** -19.720 
 [-1.352] [-2.550] [-0.815] 
Observations 62,111 57,161 61,059 
Loan type dummies N N Y 
Loan purpose dummies N N Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Firm dummies Y Y Y 
Bank dummies N Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y Y 
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Panel B: The effect of Forex risk on loan spreads 
 
 
(1) 
AISD 
(2) 
AISD 
(3) 
AISD 
Forex risk 60.413*** 47.079*** 57.522*** 
 [8.727] [2.973] [3.014] 
Loan amount -14.924*** -13.976*** -13.101*** 
 [-12.862] [-5.777] [-4.968] 
Maturity -0.113 -0.091 -0.131 
 [-0.922] [-0.904] [-1.325] 
Collateral 109.717*** 119.488*** 121.635*** 
 [23.307] [25.427] [27.533] 
Number of lenders -2.021*** -1.701*** -1.697*** 
 [-5.598] [-3.990] [-4.281] 
Performance provisions -53.015*** -49.481*** -49.406*** 
 [-7.547] [-5.176] [-5.374] 
General covenants -0.818 -1.117 -1.335 
 [-0.402] [-0.580] [-0.772] 
Return on assets -330.761*** -350.386*** -378.359*** 
 [-6.877] [-6.145] [-6.474] 
NPLs 388.700*** 370.566*** 339.226*** 
 [7.400] [6.810] [6.353] 
RBC ratio 67.157*** 65.861*** 90.927*** 
 [4.500] [5.151] [8.440] 
Bank size -0.239 0.103 0.070 
 [-0.556] [0.103] [0.129] 
Constant -12,173.363*** -11,444.107*** -11,666.043*** 
 [-25.219] [-12.518] [-16.840] 
Observations 4,095 4,780 5,103 
Loan type dummies Y Y Y 
Loan purpose dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Firm dummies Y Y Y 
Bank dummies Y Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Clustering Country Country Country 
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Table A8. Focusing on European and U.S lenders 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are 
defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The lower part of 
the table denotes the type of fixed effects used. In specifications (1) and (2), we interact Forex risk × Different 
currency with USA, i.e., a dummy variable equal to 1 for all U.S. lenders, otherwise zero. In specifications 
(3) and (4), we interact Forex risk × Different currency with EU, i.e., a dummy variable equal to 1 for all 
European lenders, otherwise zero. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forex risk -2.644 5.061 4.405 11.081 
 [-0.347] [0.483] [1.047] [1.621] 
Different currency -15.013* -11.496 -9.637** -3.974 
 [-1.758] [-1.572] [-2.065] [-0.906] 
Forex risk × Different currency 32.317*** 28.923** 25.161*** 17.321** 
 [3.420] [2.119] [3.325] [2.136] 
Forex risk × Different currency × USA 6.492 6.001   
 [0.289] [0.235]   
Forex risk × Different currency × EU   31.478 68.795 
   [0.998] [1.456] 
Loan amount -5.825*** -6.015*** -5.820*** -6.008*** 
 [-3.907] [-4.306] [-3.900] [-4.282] 
Maturity 0.670*** 0.703*** 0.670*** 0.702*** 
 [6.340] [6.550] [6.346] [6.551] 
Collateral -7.417 -9.453 -7.417 -9.469 
 [-1.179] [-1.357] [-1.179] [-1.359] 
Number of lenders -0.402*** -0.367** -0.405*** -0.369** 
 [-3.406] [-2.454] [-3.345] [-2.432] 
Performance provisions -23.816*** -23.337*** -23.813*** -23.336*** 
 [-24.214] [-19.949] [-23.765] [-19.469] 
General covenants 2.984*** 2.560** 2.970*** 2.558** 
 [4.286] [2.435] [4.251] [2.450] 
Return on assets -159.539***  -159.524***  
 [-13.492]  [-13.503]  
NPLs 133.759***  133.734***  
 [11.644]  [11.675]  
RBC ratio 15.547***  15.545***  
 [4.236]  [4.243]  
Bank size -0.264  -0.263  
 [-1.248]  [-1.240]  
Forex risk × USA 9.345 5.247   
 [0.860] [0.382]   
Different currency × USA -2.102 1.649   
 [-0.155] [0.118]   
EU   0.649  
   [0.010]  
Forex risk × EU   -15.800 -16.815 
   [-1.178] [-1.197] 
Different currency × EU   -17.115 -32.625 
   [-0.978] [-1.249] 
Observations 109,667 107,751 109,667 107,751 
Adj. R-squared 0.770 0.766 0.770 0.766 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y N Y N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N Y N Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country 
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Table A9. Control for monetary conditions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the control 
for the monetary conditions within-year. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in 
Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The lower part of the 
table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forex risk -5.091 2.516 -5.148 2.300 
 [-0.708] [0.311] [-0.719] [0.284] 
Different currency -26.033** -22.016 -26.043** -22.129 
 [-2.511] [-1.519] [-2.520] [-1.520] 
Forex risk × Different currency 57.657*** 60.241** 57.618*** 60.341** 
 [2.934] [2.097] [2.944] [2.089] 
Loan amount -7.285*** -7.420*** -7.287*** -7.418*** 
 [-3.292] [-3.573] [-3.293] [-3.575] 
Maturity 1.016*** 1.030*** 1.017*** 1.030*** 
 [6.959] [6.853] [6.956] [6.849] 
Collateral -5.966 -9.855 -5.965 -9.849 
 [-1.146] [-1.571] [-1.145] [-1.566] 
Number of lenders -0.517*** -0.329* -0.517*** -0.329* 
 [-3.333] [-1.774] [-3.328] [-1.763] 
Performance provisions -21.557*** -21.160*** -21.574*** -21.226*** 
 [-24.601] [-26.830] [-24.729] [-26.928] 
General covenants 3.756*** 3.789** 3.765*** 3.796** 
 [3.628] [2.411] [3.636] [2.415] 
Return on assets -180.325***  -180.270***  
 [-16.848]  [-16.845]  
NPLs 166.967***  167.034***  
 [14.574]  [14.557]  
RBC ratio 14.118**  14.115**  
 [2.297]  [2.295]  
Bank size -0.405*  -0.405*  
 [-1.706]  [-1.701]  
Shadow rate -2.489** -7.485***   
 [-2.633] [-6.103]   
Shadow rate 3M   -2.283* -8.273*** 
   [-1.871] [-10.496] 
Observations 72,229 71,463 72,229 71,463 
Adj. R-squared 0.750 0.747 0.750 0.747 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y N Y N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N Y N Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country 
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Table A10. Introduction of the euro and exclusion of specific loan types 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects 
used in each specification. In specifications (1) and (2), we use a common country-id for all EMU Member States following each 
Member's accession into the EMU. In specifications (3) and (4), we strictly include term and revolver loans and exclude other 
specialized loan facilities. In specifications (5) and (6), we exclude loans for LBOs and M&As. The *, **, and *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Forex risk 1.116 7.271 2.884 7.411 1.756 5.408 
 [0.246] [1.115] [0.527] [1.038] [0.366] [0.690] 
Different currency -13.848** -10.300** -14.013** -10.272** -11.220* -9.147* 
 [-2.535] [-2.583] [-2.237] [-2.074] [-1.905] [-1.663] 
Forex risk × Different currency 31.687*** 30.418*** 31.191*** 31.281*** 26.923*** 30.173** 
 [4.380] [3.206] [4.095] [3.411] [3.596] [2.356] 
Loan amount -5.823*** -6.014*** -5.792*** -5.990*** -5.523*** -5.695*** 
 [-3.521] [-3.862] [-3.736] [-4.149] [-3.753] [-4.187] 
Maturity 0.670*** 0.703*** 0.736*** 0.770*** 0.666*** 0.698*** 
 [6.384] [6.782] [7.171] [7.608] [6.089] [6.242] 
Collateral -7.436 -9.456 -7.947 -9.875 -9.068 -10.740 
 [-1.141] [-1.289] [-1.172] [-1.339] [-1.263] [-1.352] 
Number of lenders -0.402*** -0.368** -0.422*** -0.394** -0.386*** -0.356** 
 [-3.120] [-2.251] [-3.293] [-2.440] [-3.383] [-2.317] 
Performance provisions -23.815*** -23.327*** -23.865*** -23.455*** -23.986*** -24.171*** 
 [-21.476] [-17.639] [-24.232] [-20.842] [-20.924] [-17.852] 
General covenants 2.983*** 2.563** 3.053*** 2.650** 3.199*** 3.050** 
 [4.337] [2.326] [4.177] [2.330] [4.687] [2.468] 
Return on assets -159.554***  -160.992***  -167.548***  
 [-13.054]  [-14.155]  [-13.384]  
NPLs 133.832***  137.795***  133.717***  
 [12.731]  [11.981]  [10.240]  
RBC ratio 15.528***  16.679***  16.855***  
 [4.429]  [3.895]  [4.353]  
Bank size -0.262  -0.273  -0.214  
 [-1.298]  [-1.247]  [-0.924]  
Observations 109,667 107,751 105,652 103,806 100,844 98,981 
Adj. R-squared 0.770 0.766 0.767 0.763 0.770 0.766 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y N Y N Y N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N Y N Y N Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country 
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Table A11. Control for differences in the macroeconomic environments of borrowers and lenders 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of several control variables for the differences in the macroeconomic environments of 
borrowers and lenders. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The lower part of the table 
denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Forex risk 2.117 2.288 2.564 2.209 0.184 -7.056 0.542 -3.267 
 [0.449] [0.480] [0.536] [0.453] [0.038] [-0.917] [0.106] [-0.624] 
Different currency -15.098** -15.146** -15.370*** -16.448*** -21.982** -27.567** -15.022** -30.133** 
 [-2.581] [-2.602] [-2.711] [-2.655] [-2.535] [-2.300] [-2.045] [-2.444] 
Forex risk × Different currency 
 
33.651*** 33.687*** 34.127*** 36.583*** 45.648*** 47.885** 34.139*** 66.014*** 
[4.652] [4.678] [4.617] [4.784] [4.498] [2.460] [4.246] [2.834] 
Loan amount -5.890*** -5.893*** -5.880*** -5.895*** -5.878*** -6.302*** -5.909*** -7.452*** 
 [-4.056] [-4.049] [-4.009] [-4.027] [-3.840] [-4.954] [-4.677] [-3.059] 
Maturity 0.701*** 0.701*** 0.701*** 0.703*** 0.621*** 0.936*** 0.752*** 0.799*** 
 [6.424] [6.420] [6.417] [6.402] [4.637] [7.551] [6.115] [5.806] 
Collateral -5.413 -5.416 -5.471 -5.234 -7.060 -4.794 -5.660 -10.620 
 [-0.981] [-0.984] [-0.979] [-0.964] [-1.128] [-0.997] [-1.128] [-1.264] 
Number of lenders -0.409*** -0.410*** -0.414*** -0.427*** -0.390** -0.639*** -0.503*** -0.762*** 
 [-3.336] [-3.361] [-3.382] [-3.262] [-2.495] [-3.430] [-3.539] [-2.917] 
Performance provisions 
 
-23.421*** -23.418*** -23.360*** -23.377*** -21.515*** -21.219*** -22.998*** -21.887*** 
[-22.355] [-22.409] [-21.962] [-22.194] [-19.396] [-24.943] [-23.713] [-14.442] 
General covenants 2.847*** 2.846*** 2.848*** 2.851*** 2.411*** 2.973*** 2.759*** 2.802 
 [4.215] [4.185] [4.096] [4.065] [2.659] [3.320] [3.771] [1.613] 
Return on assets -164.411*** -164.462*** -164.064*** -163.736*** -175.329*** -155.711*** -156.540*** -204.879*** 
 [-14.804] [-14.831] [-14.809] [-14.824] [-13.795] [-13.658] [-15.617] [-13.855] 
NPLs 138.618*** 138.535*** 138.802*** 138.565*** 123.388*** 139.117*** 143.606*** 154.648*** 
 [13.358] [13.312] [13.318] [14.372] [8.714] [11.812] [14.606] [11.667] 
RBC ratio 15.476*** 15.458*** 15.474*** 15.331*** 20.645*** 8.226** 14.759*** 22.440*** 
 [4.021] [4.006] [3.987] [3.984] [4.212] [2.419] [3.922] [3.509] 
Bank size -0.292 -0.291 -0.285 -0.292 -0.363 -0.275 -0.259 -0.607* 
 [-1.272] [-1.269] [-1.251] [-1.262] [-1.177] [-1.432] [-1.224] [-1.854] 
GDP per capita 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.002 0.002** 0.003 
 [3.374] [3.641] [3.639] [3.197] [2.736] [-0.672] [2.153] [1.429] 
GDP growth  -1.422 -0.795 -2.120 -1.946 -2.212 -2.616* -0.544 
  [-0.805] [-0.497] [-1.321] [-0.954] [-1.482] [-1.746] [-0.231] 
Trade openness   -0.446      
   [-1.488]      
Inflation    1.292     
    [0.848]     
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Inflation change     -0.570    
     [-0.232]    
Trade balance      0.000   
      [1.268]   
Stock market 
capitalization 
      0.113**  
      [2.060]  
VIX       1.222***  
       [3.909]  
Debt        -0.214 
        [-0.589] 
Observations 104,886 104,883 104,834 104,434 84,714 83,652 96,572 55,995 
Adj. R-squared 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.753 0.766 0.766 0.737 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
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Table A12. Control for differences in institutions between the borrower and lender countries 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of several control variables for the differences in the institutional environments of borrowers 
and lenders. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The lower part of the table denotes the 
type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Forex risk 2.203 2.320 3.244 2.980 3.020 3.236 3.111 3.158 
 [0.473] [0.493] [0.587] [0.546] [0.549] [0.587] [0.560] [0.571] 
Different currency -15.871** -15.913** -17.037** -16.923** -17.110** -17.285** -17.102** -17.125** 
 [-2.487] [-2.506] [-2.513] [-2.519] [-2.571] [-2.581] [-2.534] [-2.548] 
Forex risk × Different currency 
 
33.557*** 33.496*** 37.327*** 37.046*** 37.231*** 37.643*** 37.393*** 37.498*** 
[4.472] [4.503] [4.096] [4.069] [4.112] [4.010] [4.075] [4.155] 
Loan amount -5.799*** -5.802*** -6.102*** -6.106*** -6.104*** -6.102*** -6.103*** -6.101*** 
 [-4.109] [-4.089] [-3.951] [-3.951] [-3.949] [-3.956] [-3.949] [-3.943] 
Maturity 0.685*** 0.687*** 0.802*** 0.802*** 0.802*** 0.802*** 0.802*** 0.802*** 
 [6.140] [6.114] [5.879] [5.879] [5.877] [5.881] [5.879] [5.883] 
Collateral -5.272 -5.244 -5.523 -5.509 -5.489 -5.470 -5.485 -5.452 
 [-0.904] [-0.904] [-0.890] [-0.883] [-0.882] [-0.878] [-0.882] [-0.882] 
Number of lenders -0.395*** -0.396*** -0.461*** -0.462*** -0.460*** -0.462*** -0.462*** -0.461*** 
 [-3.011] [-3.038] [-3.179] [-3.186] [-3.182] [-3.171] [-3.171] [-3.180] 
Performance provisions 
 
-23.865*** -23.885*** -23.344*** -23.328*** -23.320*** -23.318*** -23.323*** -23.325*** 
[-22.697] [-22.859] [-24.854] [-25.209] [-25.174] [-25.091] [-25.114] [-25.188] 
General covenants 2.893*** 2.890*** 3.133*** 3.158*** 3.150*** 3.119*** 3.144*** 3.134*** 
 [4.214] [4.167] [3.715] [3.703] [3.755] [3.636] [3.741] [3.747] 
Return on assets -171.359*** -170.953*** -174.675*** -174.578*** -174.618*** -174.719*** -174.694*** -174.684*** 
 [-15.662] [-16.037] [-15.301] [-15.294] [-15.277] [-15.347] [-15.281] [-15.297] 
NPLs 133.225*** 133.309*** 142.797*** 142.803*** 142.934*** 142.875*** 142.817*** 142.834*** 
 [11.972] [11.966] [13.561] [13.526] [13.562] [13.529] [13.584] [13.545] 
RBC ratio 15.767*** 15.592*** 14.924*** 14.965*** 14.998*** 14.918*** 14.938*** 14.979*** 
 [3.827] [3.837] [3.306] [3.319] [3.336] [3.303] [3.303] [3.317] 
Bank size -0.248 -0.252 -0.346 -0.346 -0.345 -0.345 -0.345 -0.345 
 [-0.993] [-1.000] [-1.383] [-1.382] [-1.386] [-1.376] [-1.381] [-1.377] 
GDP per capita 0.003** 0.003** 0.002 0.003 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [2.210] [2.419] [1.301] [1.508] [1.771] [1.230] [1.503] [1.341] 
GDP growth  -1.831 -3.402 -3.135 -3.083 -3.202 -3.188 -3.180 
  [-0.916] [-1.155] [-1.108] [-1.094] [-1.124] [-1.124] [-1.145] 
Imputed polity  23.272* 41.398** 39.411** 41.490** 41.646** 39.042** 38.540** 
  [1.789] [2.266] [2.272] [2.443] [2.241] [2.314] [2.010] 
Polity 25.372*        
 [1.685]        
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Business freedom   -0.373      
   [-0.795]      
Economic freedom    0.878     
    [1.046]     
Financial freedom     0.242    
     [1.281]    
Fiscal freedom      -0.243   
      [-0.677]   
Monetary freedom       0.254  
       [0.345]  
Trade freedom        -0.947 
        [-0.914] 
Observations 99,908 99,995 89,776 89,776 89,776 89,776 89,776 89,776 
Adj. R-squared 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
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Table A13. Different clustering of standard errors 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS. The lower part of the table denotes 
the type of fixed effects used in each specification and the last line of the table denotes the type of standard error clustering (B&F&Y refers to Bank and Firm and Year). The *, **, and *** 
marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Forex risk 1.116 7.271 1.116 7.271 1.116 7.271 1.116 7.271 
 [0.234] [1.208] [0.212] [1.028] [0.231] [1.222] [0.223] [0.920] 
Different currency -13.848** -10.300 -13.848** -10.300 -13.848** -10.300 -13.848* -10.300* 
 [-2.051] [-1.303] [-2.205] [-1.441] [-2.018] [-1.324] [-1.925] [-1.865] 
Forex risk × Different currency 
 
31.687*** 30.418** 31.687*** 30.418** 31.687*** 30.418** 31.687** 30.418** 
[2.913] [2.336] [3.021] [2.142] [2.875] [2.379] [2.650] [2.497] 
Loan amount -5.823*** -6.014*** -5.823*** -6.014*** -5.823*** -6.014*** -5.823*** -6.014*** 
 [-14.604] [-14.936] [-6.285] [-6.360] [-13.425] [-13.650] [-7.351] [-7.222] 
Maturity 0.670*** 0.703*** 0.670*** 0.703*** 0.670*** 0.703*** 0.670*** 0.703*** 
 [19.222] [19.555] [6.508] [6.392] [16.278] [16.400] [5.990] [6.097] 
Collateral -7.436*** -9.456*** -7.436** -9.456** -7.436*** -9.456*** -7.436** -9.456** 
 [-2.933] [-3.487] [-1.994] [-2.457] [-2.735] [-3.276] [-2.103] [-2.399] 
Number of lenders -0.402*** -0.368*** -0.402** -0.368** -0.402*** -0.368*** -0.402** -0.368** 
 [-3.614] [-3.107] [-2.425] [-2.287] [-3.119] [-2.958] [-2.415] [-2.360] 
Performance provisions 
 
-23.815*** -23.327*** -23.815*** -23.327*** -23.815*** -23.327*** -23.815*** -23.327*** 
[-12.557] [-11.971] [-8.443] [-8.222] [-12.145] [-11.530] [-8.887] [-8.881] 
General covenants 2.983*** 2.563** 2.983* 2.563 2.983** 2.563** 2.983* 2.563 
 [2.615] [2.051] [1.767] [1.374] [2.529] [2.009] [2.037] [1.520] 
Return on assets -159.554***  -159.554***  -159.554***  -159.554***  
 [-9.987]  [-7.826]  [-10.192]  [-8.072]  
NPLs 133.832***  133.832***  133.832***  133.832***  
 [8.786]  [6.936]  [9.212]  [6.499]  
RBC ratio 15.528***  15.528**  15.528***  15.528**  
 [2.784]  [2.462]  [2.992]  [2.310]  
Bank size -0.262  -0.262  -0.262  -0.262  
 [-1.185]  [-0.999]  [-1.229]  [-1.055]  
Observations 109,667 107,751 109,667 107,751 109,667 107,751 109,667 107,751 
Adj. R-squared 0.773 0.779 0.771 0.767 0.770 0.766 0.770 0.766 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y N Y N Y N Y N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Clustering Loan Loan Bank Bank Firm Firm B&F&Y B&F&Y 
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Table A14. Control for macroeconomic fundamentals in lender countries 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of 
macroeconomic control variables for the lenders’ country, instead of bank × year fixed effects. Dependent 
variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors 
clustered by country. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each 
specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forex risk 0.467 2.055 0.847 -0.847 
 [0.071] [0.372] [0.149] [-0.148] 
Different currency -18.917** -24.106** -15.713** -23.216** 
 [-2.362] [-2.360] [-2.205] [-2.386] 
Forex risk × Different currency 28.743*** 35.442*** 35.564*** 47.217*** 
 [3.622] [2.939] [4.447] [4.210] 
Loan amount -6.962*** -7.157*** -6.005*** -5.933*** 
 [-7.084] [-7.809] [-4.256] [-3.936] 
Maturity 0.591*** 0.486*** 0.696*** 0.611*** 
 [4.287] [3.351] [6.238] [4.609] 
Collateral -3.313 -4.133 -4.666 -6.327 
 [-1.097] [-1.304] [-0.941] [-1.067] 
Number of lenders -0.418*** -0.340*** -0.466*** -0.399** 
 [-5.964] [-5.649] [-3.083] [-2.443] 
Performance provisions -23.306*** -22.440*** -23.345*** -21.641*** 
 [-41.214] [-29.277] [-21.878] [-20.413] 
General covenants 2.655*** 2.131*** 2.797*** 2.379*** 
 [4.958] [3.146] [4.696] [2.806] 
Return on assets -152.978*** -164.806*** -163.953*** -174.488*** 
 [-13.547] [-12.193] [-15.087] [-13.941] 
NPLs 131.863*** 114.022*** 136.624*** 120.903*** 
 [13.058] [8.847] [13.517] [8.673] 
RBC ratio 13.685*** 18.297*** 16.233*** 21.695*** 
 [4.510] [4.489] [3.766] [4.083] 
Bank size -0.314* -0.379 -0.277 -0.364 
 [-1.690] [-1.465] [-1.145] [-1.143] 
GDP growth -2.550** -2.451* -2.220 -2.498 
 [-2.058] [-1.725] [-1.213] [-1.158] 
Money growth -0.024 -0.136   
 [-0.128] [-1.197]   
Inflation -3.345**  1.595  
 [-2.611]  [0.912]  
Inflation change  -7.069**  -1.984 
  [-2.599]  [-0.681] 
Interest rate   2.375** 1.783 
   [2.034] [1.270] 
Observations 83,687 68,493 101,916 83,177 
Adjusted R-squared 0.770 0.762 0.763 0.753 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Country effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Clustering Country Country Country Country 
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Estimation of the Lerner index 
In this section, we estimate the Lerner index at the bank-year level, by heavily relying on Delis, 
Kokas and Ongena (2017). The Lerner index of market power is defined as 𝑝 −
𝑚𝑐
𝑝
, where p is 
the average lending rate given by each bank in each year and mc is the marginal cost of 
producing bank output (also at the bank-year). We proxy the lending rate from the ratio of 
interest income to total commercial loans (information from Compustat). Subsequently, we 
estimate marginal cost from a simple cost function of the form: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎1 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑙 + 𝑎4𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑎5𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑑 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡,           (A.1) 
where C is the total cost of the bank i at time t, measured by the deflated total interest expenses 
and total noninterest expenses; Q is the total output of each bank, measured by the deflated 
total earning assets (or simply total assets in robustness tests); wl is the price of labor, measured 
by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets; wk is the price of physical capital, measured 
by the ratio of overheads minus personnel expenses to fixed assets; and wd is the price of 
intermediation funds, measured by the ratio of total interest expenses to total customer deposits. 
We collect data from Bloomberg. 
 We estimate equation (A.1) using a local linear regression with a uniform kernel and 
derive the marginal cost from the derivative of the equation with respect to Q. The advantage 
of the non-parametric approach is its flexibility compared to parametric functional forms (e.g., 
the translog) and this can lead to substantial improvement in the precision of the estimates. 
However, we also use a translog specification and a parametric regression with the same 
outputs and input prices and our end results remain very similar. 
 
